

Moderates vs. hard-liners

Hawks could lose ground in second round of administration internecine fighting STAT

By Richard Straus and
Ken Wollack

Washington—Every four years Washingtonians engage in one of their favorite pastimes—speculating about top appointees in a new administration. With the Democrats trailing so badly in the polls, there has been understandably little interest in forecasting Walter F. Mondale's team. Instead, attention has focused on possible personnel shifts in a second Reagan term.

Ordinarily this Washington "name game" would be of little importance to anyone beyond the small group of people immediately involved. However, after experiencing nearly four years of Ronald Reagan's "disengaged" approach to the presidency, the question of who makes day-to-day decisions on domestic and, more important, foreign policy issues assumes much greater significance.

The first-term Reagan administration has been riven by internecine quarreling. Some argue that these battles among Cabinet equals are an inevitable consequence of Mr. Reagan's detached manner of governing. Yet paradoxically, the president also has insisted upon collegiality among his top advisers.

It is notable that in an administration whose secretary of labor is under indictment and whose attorney general-designate needed a clean bill of health from a special prosecutor, the only Cabinet official to be fired was former Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig Jr. And his crime? In the words of one White House official, "He could never get along. He always wanted to make an issue of everything."

Even the much-heralded Reagan ideology proves, upon closer examination, only to add another discordant note. That is particularly true when viewing his choice of foreign policy aides. On the one hand, the president selected as his national security adviser Robert C. McFarlane, perhaps the archetypal centrist technocrat. To replace the contentious Alexander Haig at state, he appointed George P. Shultz, a more easy-going member of the Nixon-Ford team.

On the other hand, the hawkish right is well represented with Caspar W. Weinberger at defense, William J. Casey at the Central Intelligence Agency and Jeane J. Kirkpatrick at the United Nations. It is no wonder that battles rage constantly between these two groups on subjects as diverse as arms control, Central America and the Mid-

dle East.

However, because of the need to avoid bringing conflicts to the president, disputes between the two camps are either resolved before they reach the president or are left unresolved. But in either case, the hard-liners have gained the upper hand.

On arms control issues, Mr. Weinberger and his aide Richard Perle, despite election-year pressures, have been able to maintain the administration's tough stance. Shultz allies assert that Mr. Weinberger and Mr. Perle believe the U.S. must confront the Soviet Union at every turn; that arms control is acceptable only when Soviet behavior changes.

White House officials concede that Mr. Weinberger and Mr. Perle have outmaneuvered the State Department moderates. Mr. Perle, in particular, is cited as a superior bureaucratic infighter. "He couches the arguments in unassailable terms," one White House insider said. "He has made 'the need to contain communism' an effective marketing tool."

Mr. Perle, unlike Mr. McFarlane or Mr. Shultz, also has done his homework. Neither Mr. McFarlane nor his National Security Council staff is well-versed in the esoterica that constitute arms control policy. Mr. Shultz reportedly promised to master the material when he first took office. "People are still waiting," complained one State Department official.

Mr. Weinberger, with the support of Mr. Casey and Mrs. Kirkpatrick, has, according to State Department aides, achieved an even greater dominance over Central American policy. Some State Department officials have all but given up hope of moderating the increasingly hostile administration attitude towards Nicaragua. They are convinced Mr. Weinberger and Mrs. Kirkpatrick believe the U.S. cannot tolerate the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. They predict more military "rotations" in Honduras, perhaps resulting in a military confrontation during the next four years.

If, in the Middle East, administration bureaucratic roles are reversed, particularly in Lebanon, the outcome was nevertheless the same. It was Mr. Shultz and Mr. McFarlane who pressed for a U.S. military role in Lebanon, with Mr. Weinberger and the Pentagon opposed.

Mr. Weinberger eventually came out on top by compelling the president to be effective with this disengaged president.

Without rancor, he simply refused to go along with agreed-upon decisions. For example, Mr. Shultz thought he had hammered out an agreement to increase the level of U.S. naval activity on behalf of the Beirut government in exchange for Mr. Weinberger's long-held desire to withdraw the Marines.

But the secretary of defense simply refused to live up to his end of the bargain. With President Reagan winging his way out of town as the withdrawal announcement was made, the Pentagon simply pulled the plug. Left in the wake in Washington, frustrated Weinberger critics could only impotently fume about "rank insubordination" by the Department of Defense.

With the bureaucratic players' positions on major issues clearly defined, and with no reason to expect the president to change his manner of governing, the question remaining is whether the lineup itself will change. The most momentous change brooded about involves not a key foreign policy actor, but rather White House Chief of Staff James A. Baker III. However, if Mr. Baker is granted his wish to move to an open Cabinet slot (attorney general?), a chain reaction having a direct impact on foreign policy could ensue. White House officials hold no illusions that Secretary of the Interior William P. Clark would lobby vigorously for Mr. Baker's job. Mr. Clark admires Mrs. Kirkpatrick, and, as chief of staff, would be considered sympathetic to her desire to exchange the U.N. position for a high-level Washington post.

Since ambassador to the United Nations carries Cabinet rank, it is doubtful Mrs. Kirkpatrick would accept anything less than secretary of state or national security adviser. But Mr. McFarlane and Mr. Shultz show no signs of planning to leave their posts any time soon. Moreover, in the view of a number of administration officials, Mrs. Kirkpatrick displays the same "rough edges" that torpedoed Mr. Haig.

On the other hand, the moderates are hoping they can eliminate or neutralize a few hard-liners. They believe that, excepting Mrs. Kirkpatrick, the hard-liners have few candidates to offer for even sub-Cabinet positions. "We have the whole known universe of such people already in the administration," one White House aide says.

One move widely expected is for Mr. Shultz to try to place his leading arms

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28 October 1984*Joseph Kraft*

The Blame Falls On Casey

The Central Intelligence Agency is going into the public pillory again. But this time nobody can blame those favorite whipping boys—the liberals of the 1970s.

This time the blame falls squarely on the CIA and its present director, William Casey. Under his tutelage, the agency has misled the White House and Congress, thus shattering the base of bipartisan support for intelligence activities.

The agency originally came into bad odor in the wake of Watergate and the Vietnam War. Investigation by a Senate committee headed by the late Frank Church of Idaho showed that the CIA had a hand in all kinds of dirty operations, including attempted assassinations.

In that period, those who tried to defend the agency as a valuable national resource could at least argue that the temper of the times was sour. Unfortunately, Jimmy Carter made one of his worst appointments in naming Adm. Stansfield Turner to be director of Central Intelligence. Turner very early began a feud, which he is still indulging in, with the "old boy" network of CIA veterans.

But there were figures in Congress, particularly among defense-minded Democrats, who saw the need to rebuild. They worked behind the scenes to make more money available to the agency and to restore morale. A good example is Sen. Daniel Moynihan, the New York Democrat, who has been serving as vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee.

"When I came in," Moynihan recalled recently, "I asked myself whether we shouldn't scrap the CIA and start over again. The officers who came up here looked so damaged.

They couldn't think on their feet. They couldn't play checkers, let alone chess. They were good people who had been hurt. But of course we couldn't close it down. So we tried healing. We gave them money and told them they were first rate. And there were signs of progress."

The progress halted with the appointment of Casey as director in 1981, and the onset of covert operations in Nicaragua. Casey would have been an embarrassment to any bureau of government. Before becoming director, he was mixed up in charges of plagiarism and was hip deep in Watergate. At the agency, he was involved in smelly stock transactions, dubious testimony on the Carter briefing book and association with shabby characters. A former Republican secretary of state, trying to defend Casey, could only say, "He's not as sleazy as he looks."

As to Nicaragua, the right-wing dictatorship of the Somozas was ousted in 1979. The successor regime, democratic at first, quickly yielded to a group called the Sandinistas, with ties to Cuba and the Soviet Union and a background in Marxism-Leninism. The United States undertook to harass the Sandinistas by supporting against them a guerrilla force known as the *contras*.

"From the first it didn't feel right," Moynihan said of the CIA operation against the Sandinistas. "You knew you were dealing with one part of the agency, not the whole. Somewhere in that place were a group of people like an outfit in a Le Carré novel. They were looking for somebody to give them a job again. Some of their briefings about their plans came close to fantasizing. Then they began to hide things."

One operation hidden from the Senate committee was the mining of Nicaraguan harbors. When events disclosed the fact, Barry Goldwater, the committee chairman, fired off an angry message to Casey. Moynihan tried unsuccessfully to find out what had happened. Then, on April 12, 1984, President Reagan's national security adviser, Robert McFarlane, told a conference at Annapolis that "every important detail" of the mining had been "shared in full" with the congressional committee.

As a protest against being called a liar in public, Moynihan resigned as vice chairman. Casey, prodded by the White House, made a public apology to the committee. Moynihan claims that McFarlane told him that in reporting to the White House, the CIA had been "either disingenuous or outright wrong." A second case of "hiding" now surfaces with the manual written by a contract employee of the CIA which advised the *contras* to "neutralize" or assassinate, Sandinista officials. The Senate committee was not told of that manual, which sanctioned terrorism and violated a presidential order. In the foreign policy debate, President Reagan said the manual had been heavily excised both by the CIA in the field and at headquarters. He claimed only a handful of the original manuals was distributed.

That turns out to be a cock-and-bull story. There was little editing, and hundreds of manuals were distributed. But what the president said was what the CIA had told the White House.

Obviously something is very wrong. Congressional support for the agency is now almost nil. Moynihan says of Casey and the agency, "It breaks my heart. We need an intelligence capacity. But they're hurting themselves and they don't know it. They still don't understand they are damaging the president, not helping him."

WASHINGTON POST
27 October 1984

Decision Date Nears on Question Of Banning Some Soviet Imports

STAT

1930 Law Against 'Forced-Labor' Goods Could Be Imposed

By Murrey Marder
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Reagan administration is approaching the climax of a year-long skirmish with critics who want it to punish Soviet abuses of human rights by imposing stiff restrictions on Soviet imports produced with "slave labor."

The dispute turns on whether to ban up to half of the Soviet goods and material entering the United States by extending a rarely applied 1930 ban on imports believed to be made with forced labor.

Secretary of State George P. Shultz and other members of the Cabinet are reported to have warned that use of the import restriction could produce a trade war that could be far more damaging to lucrative U.S. grain sales to the Soviet Union than it would be to the Kremlin.

Members of Congress and other advocates of the ban question whether it would bring on a trade war. In any event, they maintain, the administration has no choice under existing law but to enforce it.

If a broad ban had existed in 1982, it is estimated that it could have barred \$138 million of the \$227.5 million in imports from the Soviet Union. U.S. exports to the Soviet Union that year were lopsidedly greater: \$2.6 billion, of which \$1.85 billion was in grain sales.

This is a sensitive dispute for an administration that stresses its readiness to negotiate on all sources of superpower tension but that has been vocal in denouncing Soviet practices. Administration attacks on "slave labor" helped to arouse the demand for the trade restrictions.

U.S. Customs Commissioner William von Raab informed Treasury Secretary Donald T. Regan in September 1983 of his plan to begin applying the forced-labor ban against 36 Soviet products. Regan is reported to have supported the plan until it ran into tough opposition from Shultz, Commerce Secretary Malcolm Baldrige, Agriculture Secretary John R. Block, and U.S. Trade Representative William E. Brock.

Regan decided last May to postpone a ruling on the ban until after Nov. 12, when the International Trade Commission is scheduled to complete a fact-finding study requested by Sen. Robert J. Dole (R-Kan.), chairman of the Senate Finance Committee.

That timetable pushed the dispute beyond the election campaign, in which President Reagan has used Soviet grain sales to court the farm vote. Reagan on Sept. 11 announced U.S. readiness to sell an additional 10 million tons of wheat and corn to the Soviet Union.

Dole is a champion of Soviet grain sales, as are many members of Congress, but he was among 45 senators who urged the administration last October to enforce the ban against the Soviet Union. In May, 84 House members made a similar appeal.

Last month a lawsuit to force the administration to enforce the ban was filed on behalf of several groups, including 33 Republican and Democratic members of the House and two perennial critics of the administration's Soviet policy, Sens. Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) and Steven D. Symms (R-Idaho).

The Sept. 26 complaint in the U.S. Court of International Trade in New York charged the administration with "arbitrary, capricious" and illegal action, and "an abuse of discretion" in failing to apply the law. Named as defendants were von Raab and Assistant Treasury Secretary John M. Walker Jr. The suit was filed by Daniel J. Popeo and Paul D. Kamenar of the Washington Legal Foundation.

At issue is a section of the 1930 Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act, which bars imports of articles or material made in whole or in part with "convict labor" or "forced labor." In the past it has been used primarily to protect U.S. companies from underpriced foreign products made with cheap prison labor, and was invoked against only one Soviet product, crabmeat, from 1950 to 1961, at the height of the Cold War.

Current requirements for blocking imports are so broadly written that the customs commissioner can or-

der the seizure of suspected goods if he has "information that reasonably but not conclusively indicates" that they are subject to the ban. It is up to the shipper or importer to prove that the imports were not made with forced labor.

During the past year, however, the Reagan administration has moved away from that sweeping criteria. Critics charge that the administration is deliberately watering down its impact on the Soviet Union. Administration officials counter that the ban has been applied inconsistently and must be uniform for all nations.

Regan said on May 17 that after the International Trade Commission study on Nov. 12, standards for applying the ban should include "a specific finding that the use of forced labor gives that foreign producer a more than *de minimus* [small] price advantage over American producers." In addition, Regan said, the customs commissioner should consider such factors as "the [apparent] value added by use of forced labor," the "percentage of time" contributed by such labor and "whether labor cost is a significant component."

As administration concern about applying the ban has increased, it has increasingly questioned the adequacy

NEW YORK TIMES
26 October 1984

STAT

Playing Reagan Musical Chairs — Without Chairs

By STEVEN R. WEISMAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 25 — Well before the first votes have been counted, the Reagan Administration is filled with rumors, gossip, wariness and free-floating anxiety about the prospects for a second term in office.

At the White House, several of President Reagan's top aides have told friends that they would love to be doing something else next year if Mr. Reagan is re-elected. Increasingly, however, they find their opportunities blocked because there seem to be no openings for them to go to.

The same situation applies to many members of the Cabinet. There is talk throughout the Administration of the need for fresh thinking and "fresh blood." Such talk gets dismissed immediately. Instead, there is a growing feeling of bureaucratic gridlock.

Not 'Asking for Heads'

"I don't know of a single person at the White House or the Cabinet who's told me that they're definitely leaving," said Senator Paul Laxalt of Nevada, chairman of the re-election drive, who is perhaps Mr. Reagan's closest friend in Washington.

"If you look at Ronald Reagan's history, you know he's never gone around asking for heads," Mr. Laxalt added. "Without people being asked to leave, I doubt very much if it would happen."

There is a consensus now that if Mr. Reagan is re-elected, almost all his top aides will remain in place at least for several months into a second term. But that consensus has not prevented an enormous amount of speculation.

Various aides said, for example, that there would be strong pressure on some Cabinet members to leave.

They said Margaret M. Heckler, Secretary of Health and Human Services, is regarded as uncooperative by

White House, re-election and budget aides. She and Education Secretary T. H. Bell, who is also disliked by budget cutters, could therefore be forced out if Mr. Reagan starts cutting their budgets next year.

Of Block and Donovan

In addition, Agriculture Secretary John R. Block is seen by some White House officials as ineffective, and there are reports that he may want to leave.

Most White House aides expect

Labor Secretary Raymond J. Donovan, now on leave of absence, to depart even if he is acquitted on charges of larceny and falsifying business records in connection with a subway construction project in New York City.

But the biggest break in the Administration gridlock, according to many officials, could come as early as next spring with the resignation of Paul A. Volcker as chairman of the Federal Reserve Board.

Mr. Volcker's term as chairman is not up until 1987, but the talk of his leaving persists throughout the Administration, with some people saying they are convinced he will go sooner rather than later.

His departure could pave the way for the selection of either Treasury Secretary Donald T. Regan or Secretary of State George P. Shultz as chairman of the Fed, according to several knowledgeable officials. Such a development, in turn, would leave a vacancy next year for James A. Baker 3d, the White House chief of staff, whose friends say he is almost desperate to leave the White House for new challenges.

Mr. Baker, leader of the Administration "pragmatists," tried unsuccessfully last fall to become Mr. Reagan's national security adviser. The President initially approved the change but then dropped the idea, bowing to the protests of Administration conservatives.

Those opposing Mr. Baker's move included William P. Clark, who was leaving the national security post to become Interior Secretary, as well as Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger, Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, the

chief United States delegate to the United Nations, and William J. Casey, Director of Central Intelligence. These conservatives would be expected to fight any attempt to have Mr. Baker become Secretary of State, not least because Mr. Weinberger and Mrs. Kirkpatrick are known to want that job themselves.

Mr. Casey, meanwhile, was said to have been infuriated by recent articles in The Washington Times and The New York Post suggesting that he would leave next year. White House aides said he brought the clippings to Mr. Reagan and won a commitment that he could stay on.

What if Baker Leaves?

Tensions between Mr. Baker and Mr. Casey, dating from their dispute over pilfered Carter campaign documents in 1980, remain so high that each was described as having suspected the other of being the source of the recent newspaper articles.

What happens if Mr. Baker leaves the White House is another subject of intense speculation. Aides agree on three possible replacements for him:

Mr. Clark, Michael K. Deaver, now the deputy White House chief of staff, and Drew Lewis, a former Transportation Secretary.

Mr. Clark has told associates that he is interested in remaining Interior Secretary but that he would accept the White House post if asked. He served a similar function when Mr. Reagan was Governor of California, but he would face adamant opposition for the chief of staff job from Administration moderates, who say that as national security adviser he had a stormy relationship with Congress.

CONTINUED

INDEX

STAT

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 26, 1984

SUBJECT

PAGE

ANNOUNCEMENTS

Saying "Au Revoir" to Jim Anderson.....1
Secretary to Address the U.N. Association.....1-2

TERRORISM

Secretary's Sherr Lecture at Park Avenue
Synagogue.....2-13,16

LEBANON

Senate Foreign Relations Committee Report on
Embassy Annex Bombing.....13-14
State Department Investigation of Bombing.....14

ITALY

Report on Assassination Attempt Against Pope;
Allegations of Soviet Involvement.....14-15

MERCENARIES

U.S. Policy; Legal Status.....15-16

DEPARTMENT/POLITICAL CAMPAIGN

Ambassadors' Endorsement of Senator Helms.....16-18

USSR

Ambassador Dobrynin at Department Today.....18-19

IRAN/IRAQ

Reported Killing of Prisoners of War.....19
Resumption of Formal U.S./Iraqi Relations.....19,20

CENTRAL AMERICA

Reports of Increased U.S. Military Maneuvers.....20

With Economic Woes Deepening, Managua Sees Years of Shortages

By STEPHEN KINZER

Special to The New York Times

MANAGUA, Nicaragua, Oct. 21 — Nicaragua's economic troubles are continuing to mount, and Government leaders are saying that shortages and other hardships will continue for at least several more years.

The Sandinistas charge that the United States has played a major role in creating these economic difficulties by cutting off foreign aid, restricting purchases of Nicaraguan goods and opposing Nicaragua's loan applications at international lending agencies.

A senior Sandinista official estimated in an interview that hostility from the Reagan Administration had cost Nicaragua \$550 million since 1981.

Businessmen Blame Government

But businessmen opposed to the Government attribute the problems to Sandinista policies restricting the private sector. They say that because their profits are limited, they have little incentive to produce.

Diplomats in Managua said other important factors contributing to the country's deepening recession were the high cost of the continuing war effort and the shrinking number of countries that still send hard-currency aid to the Sandinistas.

"We don't want to say that all our economic or social problems are caused by aggression," Carlos Nuñez, one of the nine Sandinista commanders who rule Nicaragua, said at a news conference Thursday. "But aggression has aggravated them."

Consumers Criticize Shortages

The country's deepening economic distress, which appears more acute than at any time since the 1979 revolution, is felt by a wide range of people.

Consumers complain loudly about chronic shortages, especially of products made from imported materials, such as toothpaste, deodorant and toilet paper. Taxi drivers and truckers have difficulty finding spare parts, telephone service is deteriorating and medicine is in short supply.

More than half the trucks used to transport food in and out of rural Matagalpa Province are off the road for lack of tires, according to Edmundo Vado,

chief of transportation for the regional government. In the rice-growing Matagalpa region, half the tractors are out of service because engine parts are unavailable.

Two weeks ago a Sandinista labor leader, Rubén Ulloa, warned that several large factories in Managua were on the verge of closing because they could no longer obtain hard currency to buy raw materials produced abroad.

Minister of Internal Commerce Dionisio Marengo recently urged Nicaraguans to adjust to the shortages, which he said would probably continue for the next five years.

"From a tractor to a soft drink," Mr. Marengo said, "we have to get used to using and drinking what is available."

Friday's issue of the pro-Sandinista newspaper Nuevo Diario carried an editorial asserting that economic crisis was "an objective reality which nobody can hide or deny, because it is hitting us all."

The Reagan Administration ended American aid to Nicaragua in 1981 and at the same time refused to disburse a \$9.8 million food credit that was to be used to buy wheat. Later the United States cut the amount of Nicaraguan sugar it buys at subsidized prices by 90 percent.

Yet substantial amounts of Nicaraguan produce are still imported freely into the United States. The entire Nicaraguan banana crop is sold in California. Nicaraguan coffee, meat and shellfish are regularly unloaded at American ports.

In addition, the Government-owned airline Aerónica still makes regular flights between Managua and Miami. These flights, like the exports, bring Nicaragua desperately needed foreign exchange. Like the exports, they are considered possible targets if the Administration decides after the Presidential election to increase economic pressure on the Sandinista Government.

Such measures have already been privately advocated by some Administration officials, including William J. Casey, Director of Central Intelligence, according to Western diplo-

mats. But the diplomats said the suggestion had been blocked thus far by other advisers to President Reagan, including Secretary of Commerce Malcolm Baldrige and William E. Brock, the special trade representative, who were said to fear that such steps could violate American obligations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and other international accords.

By all accounts, Nicaragua's key economic problem is its shortage of foreign exchange. Nicaragua is not industrialized and depends heavily on imports, so the lack of hard currency means that many products are scarce or unavailable. The Government expects to earn \$461 million from exports this year, according to official figures. As a bare minimum, the Government estimates it needs to import \$700 million in raw materials and spare parts to keep its productive apparatus functioning.

In addition to this deficit, Nicaragua must make regular payments on a quickly growing foreign debt. The Sandinista Government inherited a debt of \$1.6 billion when it took power in 1979, and much of that amount had been misused by the Government of President Anastasio Somoza Debayle. The debt is now estimated at \$3.5 billion.

Prospects for help from abroad do not appear bright. West Germany all but ended direct aid to Nicaragua this year, and the Netherlands is in the process of doing so, diplomats said. Both countries are NATO allies of the United States, and their Governments were described as increasingly critical of the Sandinistas.

This month the West German Parliament defeated a motion to renew disbursements on a \$8.4 million loan that has been frozen by the Government.

'We Are Going to Pay'

These aid reductions leave Sweden and Spain as the only European countries with substantial aid programs here. Many other aid projects are sponsored by Soviet-bloc or other countries, but they do not provide hard currency.

In a speech in June, Sergio Ramírez Mercado, a member of the junta, said Nicaragua would pay its foreign debts but emphasized that the military would remain the top priority. Military spending is officially put at 25 percent of the national budget, and Western diplomats think the true figure may be even higher.

"We are going to pay," Mr. Ramírez said, "but not to the point of imposing irrational sacrifices on ourselves."

On Sept. 28, the World Bank suspended credit to Nicaragua, citing the Government's failure to make timely repayments on outstanding debts. The most immediate effect of the cutoff was to delay release of a \$2 million loan already approved for improving Managua's water supply.

The United States has made a practice of opposing most loans to Nicaragua by international agencies such as the World Bank, according to American diplomats.

STAT

THIS WEEK WITH DAVID BRINKLEY
21 October 1984

*MARTIN: Meanwhile from Central America, more signals, the president of El Salvador meeting with rebels trying to overthrow his government, then government troops resuming military operations against them, depending partly on intelligence from the American CIA which lost four Americans who died in the crash of their reconnaissance plane. From Nicaragua, another signal, a pamphlet calling for rebels to kidnap all officials of the Sandinista government, to neutralize them, also to cause the death of martyrs. The apparent source, the CIA. MARK FALCOFF (American Enterprise Institute): Well after all, this isn't a tea party. I think the United States should be trying to get the Sandinista regime to live up to its promises to the OAS. And if a little bit of force here and there to show them we mean business, that's good. JAMES SHANNON (D-Mass.): The goal is to overthrow the Sandinista government, and that's in direct contradiction to what Mr. Casey, the president and others in the administration have been telling the Congress. I think that the director of the CIA should be removed, and the process of oversight of the CIA needs to be strengthened.

*John Martin

EXCERPTED

STAT

Purveyor of terrorism should stay off campus

When I was a boy in the 1950s, the President was a five star U.S. Army general. Ike Eisenhower, then recently retired Supreme Commander of European Allied Forces, presided over a nation entranced by the poverty of the corporate industrial state. When I was a boy, it seemed that everyone was building basement fallout shelters. The hysteria over communism had gripped this nation like a contagious disease. When I was a boy, we were told we were entering the Atomic Age and that this was a very good thing. When I was a boy, no one seemed to question the mission of the Central Intelligence Agency.

When I was a boy I did not know that then Secretary of State John Foster Dulles was a crook. I was blissfully unaware of his family connections to United Fruit Co. and its holdings in Central America. The significance of the fact that Dulles's brother, Allen, was head of the CIA did not register in my mind. What little I knew of the CIA had more to do with David Niven movies than the oblique reports of advisers in a place called Vietnam.

Things have become more apparent since the days Chiquita Banana cavorted in my bowl of breakfast cereal. Seen through age's bleary prism, my youth was spent in a dream fabricated by entities I did not know existed.

Things are clearer today, if less tidy, in my mind. As it turns out the CIA and United Fruit had a lot more to do with Central America than the price of bananas. The much heralded Atomic Age has become a self-generating nightmare. In the 1950s we had the luxury of an hour's warning time before the missiles rained down from the sky. Today, we are permitted as little as six minutes to make our final arrangements with the mor-

tuary. There is little talk of building bomb shelters anymore. The President bouts the wonders of corporate statism while glibly proposing to deploy nuclear weapons in the heavens. In 1984, the CIA openly recruits young talent on



the CU campus. Progress is a marvelous thing.

The CIA is nothing if not the world's leading promulgator of terrorism and counter-revolution. The Company, as its members are wont to call it, attempts to portray a sort of Madison Avenue aura of glamor and job security in its recruitment literature. As in the 1950s, the CIA's image projects a cold, corporate lethality embellished with a soothing patriotic rationale for entree into a selective club where no rules apply and everything is a secret. If one believes the CIA's propaganda pamphlets then Hugh Hefner is still a valid role model for college boys to aspire to.

Never before has a generation of youth had to face such a wall of invented reality and still keep a common identity and spontaneous vision of their future. The techniques of mass manipulation employed by the powers that be have become a matrix in which the individual must sublimate every emotion

into an abstraction called the U.S.A. or be considered unworthy, even ungrateful. The re-emergence of the far-right and the crushing of the idealism of the 1960s with hypnotic corporate imagery and state-initiated campus repression cannot be blamed solely on the introspection which many members of my generation resorted to in the 1970s. Rather, it was the conscious reaction of the ruling class to the increasing disenchantment with American culture that led to the recycled patriotism which culminated in the election of Ronald Reagan.

When real politicians were no longer able to justify the meaningless march to profits, which is U.S. policy, the corporate state produced this 1950s' actor to sell its increasingly dubious product.

The spectacle of fraternity parties being organized and catered by enormous liquor conglomerates and youth fashion dictated by sleazy designers who would have us wear their logos on the flyfront of our jeans would have been the object of scorn and derision only a few years ago.

Ten years ago we had rid our campuses of the spook recruiters. Now, they're back. Young men once again march to the military's drumbeat as students seem mesmerized by ridiculous films which glorify the fantasy of warfare. Only a desperately insecure populace could be sold on the crushing pathos which was this country's victory over Grenada. The student body, as a whole, ought to be revolted by cigar chomping Wild Bill Casey, the director of the CIA. Surely, Mr. Casey can find enough prospective agents to carry out his devious operations from the ranks of petty criminals and sundry misfits which our society breeds.

Let the CIA procure its pathetic zombies elsewhere. The last thing the CIA cares about is the future vision of liberation so cherished, one must presume, by our nation's youth.

The old adage remains true: When authority speaks, question authority. Nobody should sign away their rights to an outfit run by the same folks who shot and killed us on our campuses in our lifetime.

MacGuire lives in Boulder.

RECEIVED
39NEW YORK MAGAZINE
22 October 1984

DOING IT AGAIN

To: Fritz Mondale
From: Michael Kramer
Re: The Foreign-Policy Debate

4

CENTRAL
AMERICA:
WORRIES ABOUT
A WIDER WAR.

THE FOREIGN-AFFAIRS PROBLEM THAT MOST WORRIES THE PUBLIC IS THE RISK THAT A widening Central American war might involve American troops. You used to be well positioned on Central America, but you recently gave away half the ball game by conceding Reagan's premise: The Sandinistas *are* exporting their revolution, particularly to El Salvador. What's left for you now is to capitalize on Managua's acceptance last month of a proposed regionwide peace treaty. The proposed treaty is flawed—there is no adequate mechanism for verification of Nicaraguan restraint—but it is the product of the Contadora process that the president says he is supporting. As such, it can be taken seriously. Given the treaty's provision calling for free elections, you could challenge Reagan to rein in the *contras* during an extended campaign period—a cooling-off time that would permit the Sandinista opposition to fully contest the election. This would be a measured and statesmanlike proposal, and it could flesh out the administration's true intentions in the area. If Reagan dismisses the suggestion, you then have the standing to endorse the public's concern that he might sanction a hotter war in a second term.

On a related issue, you should blast Reagan for allowing the CIA to revise an agency analyst's report on Mexico that was at odds with the conclusion Director Casey wanted drawn. An administration that denies the truth even to itself does not deserve re-election.

RECEIVED

PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER
20 October 1984

STAT

CIA official said to reveal killings by 'contras'

J By Alfonso Chardy
J and James McCartney
Inquirer Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON — A high-ranking CIA official told congressional staff members that CIA-supported *contras* killed many middle- and lower-level government officials and civilians in Nicaragua, according to congressional sources with access to classified information.

The disclosure of the killings was made during a secret briefing late last year for senior staff members of the House intelligence committee.

Those killed included "civilians and Sandinista officials in the provinces, as well as heads of cooperatives, nurses, doctors and judges," according to a source familiar with the briefing.

A The CIA official, Dewey Claridge, former head of the CIA's clandestine operations in Latin America, insisted that such killings did not violate a 1981 executive order signed by President Reagan forbidding political assassinations.

"After all, this is a war — a paramilitary operation," Claridge was quoted as saying by one person who was present. The account of the briefing was confirmed by two other sources.

When asked for comment on the Claridge briefing, a CIA spokesman said the agency would have none.

Disclosure of the briefing added fuel to a growing controversy over a CIA manual given to the *contras* that provides detailed instructions on techniques for assassination, blackmail and kidnapping.

The manual was prepared last year, when Claridge was handling clandestine Latin American operations. Claridge has since been assigned to another high CIA position, but the agency would not disclose his new title.

Reagan has ordered two investigations into whether the CIA acted improperly in preparing the manual, whose existence was disclosed earlier this week by the Associated Press. One investigation is to be made by the CIA itself, the other by the President's Intelligence Oversight Board.

Reagan's Democratic opponent in the coming election, Walter F. Mondale, described the manual yesterday as "dirty work" and demanded the resignation of CIA Director William J. Casey. Mondale contended that Casey had failed to enforce laws that prohibit government agencies from participating in assassinations.

In his briefing, one source said, Claridge told the committee staff members "that there were no rules, no restrictions and no restraints at all on what the *contras* did inside Nicaragua." The *contras*, or counter-revolutionaries, are fighting to oust the Sandinista government of Nicaragua.

Claridge said that the term *assassination*, by the CIA's definition, did not apply to killings in Nicaragua.

He said that "these events don't constitute assassinations because as far as we are concerned assassinations are only those of heads of state," the source quoted Claridge as saying. "I leave definitions to the politicians."

The wording of Reagan's order, signed Dec. 4, 1981, did not appear to restrict the ban on assassinations to high-level officials but seemed to be a blanket ban.

In part, it said: "No person employed by or acting on behalf of the U.S. government shall engage in or conspire to engage in assassinations."

An underlying question in a burgeoning series of investigations, some by the administration and others by Congress, clearly will be whether Reagan's massive buildup of CIA covert operations has gotten out of control.

The White House said Thursday that Reagan knew nothing of the manual until he read about it in the newspapers, and White House officials suggested that it was the work of "an overzealous free lance," a low-level independent employee working under CIA contract.

One congressional source with access to classified information, however, described the White House explanation as "just B.S."

"The standard CIA practice is to contract out a lot of publications and manuals for covert actions because no one at Langley [CIA headquarters in Virginia] sits at an IBM terminal writing manuals for guerrillas," the source said.

Several former well-placed government officials said they found it hard to believe that high government officials could be unaware of policies endorsed in such a document.

Asked whether the President was concerned that he might not have been briefed about "what was going on," White House spokesman Larry Speakes advised reporters to await the results of investigations before drawing conclusions.

The congressional source who described the Claridge briefing said, "I believe the White House when they say Reagan didn't know about the manual. ... But I'm sure that other people, high-level people ... certainly knew about it probably because they approved it. They must have known."

House Speaker Thomas P. O'Neill Jr. (D., Mass.) on Thursday called for Casey's resignation soon after hearing of the manual. He asserted that the kind of internal investigation ordered by the White House was bound to be a "whitewash."

The draft of the manual disclosed by the Associated Press, 44 pages in its English translation, advises the anti-Sandinista guerrillas in Nicaragua to execute selected government officials publicly, arrange the shooting deaths of fellow members so as to create "martyrs," and blackmail ordinary citizens into working for the guerrillas.

These kinds of measures, the manual said, should help to increase public support for the anti-Sandinista movement.

Leaders of the Nicaraguan guerrillas have been quoted as saying that passages urging assassinations or kidnappings were deleted from most of the manuals before they were distributed to guerrilla forces.

CONTINUED

Rep. Edward P. Boland (D., Mass.), chairman of the House intelligence committee, asserted on Thursday that the manual proved that the administration's motives in Nicaragua have not been, as the administration has contended, to halt arms shipments to Salvadoran guerrillas.

"The war is an effort to overthrow the Sandinistas," Boland said.

The so-called covert aid that the CIA has been giving the *contras* has been a matter of contention between Congress and the White House for at least two years. Most recently, funds for continued aid were cut off by Congress earlier this month.

The Inquirer's Washington Bureau said in April that low-level assassinations by U.S. personnel, or U.S.-supported personnel, were a distinct possibility in Central America.

A congressional source was quoted at the time as saying: "Some of our people may have to be a part of low-level assassinations and will have to keep their mouths shut to protect their cover."

The Reagan administration has made a major effort to build up clandestine services of the CIA since taking office in 1981, but, as has been always true with the CIA, has declined to make details public.

Officials have confirmed, however, that at least 800 staff positions in clandestine services that were cut during the Carter administration have been restored.

Various estimates have been made on the number of CIA agents assigned to the management of the so-called secret war by the *contras*

against the Sandinistas, but no official figures have been available.

One responsible source has estimated the figure at 150. The CIA budget assigned to clandestine services has increased from about 2 or 3 percent of the overall CIA budget to about 10 percent, according to sources, although the CIA budget is classified.

Reaction to disclosure of the CIA manual reverberated throughout Washington yesterday.

The Senate intelligence committee called a hearing Monday and invited Casey to testify. The hearing is to be closed.

Speakes said that Reagan had not talked to Casey about the possibility of his stepping aside and that Casey had not offered to do so.

Inquirer Washington Bureau reporters David Hess and Charles Green also contributed to this article.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-11

WASHINGTON POST
20 October 1984

Judge Tells CIA to Make Nicaragua Papers Public

By Joanne Omang
Washington Post Staff Writer

U.S. District Court Judge June L. Green has ordered the CIA to make public 15 classified documents dealing with the origins and planning of the Reagan administration's program supporting rebels in Nicaragua.

In a decision made Tuesday and released yesterday, Green said administration officials had publicly acknowledged the officially secret program in ways that "are sufficiently 'deliberate' and 'conscious' to bring the requested information into the public domain."

The Central Intelligence Agency, which had argued that disclosure would reveal the program, will be permitted to withhold CIA employees' names and titles in the documents, the ruling said.

A CIA spokesman said there would be no comment until CIA attorneys decided whether to appeal. If the ruling is not appealed, it will make public papers that "described or authorized CIA 'covert operations in Central America which were approved by President Reagan between Aug. 6, 1981, and Aug. 6, 1982,'" according to the decision.

"This is the first time the CIA has ever been ordered to release documents on a current covert operation," said Jay Peterzell, attorney for the Center for National Security Studies, a Washington-based research organization critical of Reagan's policies in Central America. The center won the ruling under the Freedom of Information Act.

"The ruling establishes the principle that documents about current covert operations, if they're being talked about on the record by senior officials, are subject to the FOIA," Peterzell said.

The center asked in August 1982 for copies of documents on CIA involvement in El Salvador's March 1982 elections, CIA aid to El Salvador in its war with leftist guerrillas, and CIA covert operations in Central America.

It argued that the information should be made public because CIA Director William J. Casey referred to the programs in a letter and interview in The New York Times in July 1982. The CIA refused, and the center filed suit the following October, citing additional administration public statements as further evidence that the material could be released without damaging national security.

"The administration has been having it both ways on Nicaragua," Peterzell said. "On the one hand it refuses to answer pointed questions on the purpose of the operations and whether what is going on is consistent with those purposes, saying they can't talk about covert operations. But when it's of political benefit, they talk about it."

Green first ruled in favor of the CIA last April, finding that newspaper articles and official administration statements did not constitute an "official acknowledgement" of the various programs.

The judge agreed to reconsider her ruling on 15 documents pertaining to Nicaragua when the center submitted evidence that the administration had publicly admitted the program's existence on 18 occasions since her April verdict.

This included statements in the Congressional Record, excerpts from a Reagan news conference and statements by Casey and Reagan's spokesman Larry Speakes, according to the ruling.

The CIA shifted ground, arguing first that there had been no acknowledgement by high-level sources and then that even Reagan's remarks could not be used to justify publication unless they had been made with the intent to cause all the diplomatic consequences.

Green held yesterday, however, that "publicly known information cannot 'reasonably' be expected to damage national security."

STAT

19 October 1984

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prepared by the CIA, suggesting so-called selective
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Today Mondale stepped outside his Washington home to call
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Democratic candidate said he would make the CIA manual an
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actions of the CIA that injure that crucial agency, hurt
our interests in Central America, and strengthen the
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the director of the CIA before the Sunday debate. The
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with no one in charge so that these things, contrary to
our public interest, could go on without the knowledge of
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of others. So if our objective is to overthrow the
government of Nicaragua, then the legitimate question is
whether this administration plans to introduce U.S. combat
troops to achieve that objective, and that also ought to
be answered by the president of the United States.

AMERICA'S DIPLOMATIC CHARADE

by Roy Gutman

STAT

American policy toward Nicaragua seems near the point of no return. The Reagan administration now faces the choice of either abandoning its ambitious aims or achieving them at the points of U.S. bayonets. How Washington reached this position is a story of ill-formed strategy, debilitating bureaucratic struggles, and subordination of diplomacy to military pressure.

President Ronald Reagan contends that he has tried to settle the Central America crisis peacefully and points in particular to August 1981, when then Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Thomas Enders spent 2 days in "open and frank" discussions with Sandinista leaders in the Nicaraguan capital of Managua. Some papers were later exchanged, but the talks broke off in late October. The administration says Nicaragua failed to respond substantively to American concerns.

But interviews with leading U.S. policy-makers and Sandinista officials reveal that the United States itself helped scuttle the talks. Nicaragua failed to respond, but the United States never laid its complete set of demands on the table. A draft of the U.S. demands on some of the most critical security issues was prepared. But its sweeping terms included the humiliating requirement that Nicaragua return its heavy arms to Cuba, the Soviet Union, and other countries of origin. Moreover, shortly after being shown to former Nicaraguan Ambassador to the United States Arturo José Cruz, who came to the United States in December 1981, it was withdrawn to a classified safe in the State Department. There it remains—never presented, never discussed.

"I was flabbergasted by the demands," Cruz

Continued

WASHINGTON | James Reston

STAT

Reagan Vs. Reagan

WASHINGTON
Nobody can accuse the Reagan Administration of being a prisoner of its own rhetoric. It often overstates and misstates its own case, but it has been singularly successful at recovering its own fumbles and even stealing the ball from the opposition.

Secretary of State Shultz made a speech in Los Angeles the other day that was not unlike the themes of many past speeches by Walter Mondale. Mr. Shultz called for flexibility and pragmatism in dealing with the Russians, two approaches that not so long ago were regarded by many Reaganites as signs of weakness. "When the Soviet Union acts in a way we find objectionable, it may not always make sense for us to break off negotiations or suspend agreements," Mr. Shultz said.

This is precisely what the allies all the time and Mr. Mondale part of the time have been arguing for years, but in case after case, the Administration has changed its policies to meet the public mood.

It opposed allied use of U.S. materials to help build the Soviet gas pipeline to Europe, but withdrew its objections when the allies protested. Similarly, it amended its nuclear arms proposals when the European peace movement threatened the emplacement of cruise and Pershing 2 missiles on allied territory. And while condemning Moscow for its outrages in Poland, it restored grain shipments and blamed Jimmy Carter for cutting them off.

It vowed to stick in Beirut, but after the massacre of the marines and a storm of protest at home, it withdrew. When confronted with Congressional

The Gipper fumbles and recovers

opposition on Social Security, and the procurement of certain controversial weapons, it proclaimed the virtues of bipartisanship and praised the Democrats it had previously denounced.

The Administration has dealt with its own top officials in much the same way. The latest example is the handling of William Casey, the Director of Central Intelligence. When Ernest Lawrence Thayer's "Mighty Casey" struck out, "there was no joy in Mudville," but here in Slipperyville, three strikes and you're in.

Mr. Casey took one strike on the handling of his finances, and another on the mining of the Nicaraguan harbors. Then it was disclosed that a C.I.A. employee had written a pamphlet recommending how the Nicaraguan rebels could use "selective violence" to get rid of their opponents. Nobody would finger the culprit or take responsibility for what amounted to a manual for assassination.

The White House couldn't imagine who would have proposed such illegal action, so the President ordered Mr. Casey to investigate his own agency, with the help of the Intelligence Oversight Board, which is composed of three members appointed by Mr. Reagan.

There are two ways to look at all these things. First, that they are

"linked" to political expediency, and second, that they are brilliant defensive maneuvers.

Politically, there is no doubt that they divert the fire away from the President. Every time the Democrats seem to have an issue, Mr. Reagan blunts it. He blunted the peace issue though he has not ended it.

He blunted the economic issue by reducing inflation, unemployment and interest rates, leaving behind the largest deficits in the history of the country, which he blamed on the Democrats. He even withstood his fumbles in the first debate with Mr. Mondale by picking up the ball thereafter and plowing ahead as if Reagan were Riggins of the Washington Redskins.

The Democrats believe he is merely a front man for a staff of unelected White House officials, inside television producers and outside political manipulators, and that he can and does play with consummate skill the role of the warrior, or the role of peacemaker, or even of the friend of the poor. For Mr. Reagan the play's the thing and the sole object is to win.

It is true that no Presidential election in the past has been quite so dominated by television techniques and political hucksterism. But even Mr. Reagan's theatrical triumphs have left a drop of poison in their wake. He has bloodied the Democrats but he has not convinced them, for nobody has the vaguest idea which policies, the old or the new, he will follow if re-elected. This promises stormy weather ahead when, as seems likely, the President faces a Democratic majority in at least one of the two houses of Congress. □

WASHINGTON POST
20 October 1984

STAT

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BY WASSERMAN

19 October 1984

ML03>CAMPAIGN '84/>HUNTER-GAULT: It was a quiet day in the presidential <
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WASHINGTON TALK

Briefing

STAT

Party at the C.I.A.

It is not easy to get invited to visit Central Intelligence Agency headquarters at McLean, Va. The agency does have visitors but refuses to discuss its invitation policy. Occasionally, however, there is an inadvertent leak. An unsecreted message on the letterhead of the Fordham University Club of Washington, discloses: "The club has been fortunate in arranging an unusual event for its members and friends." The event is a visit to C.I.A. headquarters next month that is to include "wine and cheese" and "an off-the-record discussion," possibly with the Director of Central Intelligence, William J. Casey. No noncitizens or guests under 17 need apply. But otherwise all that is necessary is to fill out a simple security-check form and pay \$8.

James F. Clarity
Warren Weaver Jr.

Moynihan's turning the wrong faucet

Sen. Pat Moynihan offered the Senate last week a fond farewell as a member for eight years of its Select Intelligence Committee.

It is a committee which he has served with diligence and distinction. All the more perplexing, then, that he chose not to offer proposals for its much-needed reform by reducing its leak-prone staff.

There is clearly no need for the Senate committee to have 40 staff members when the House committee can get by with seven.

Instead, Moynihan raised the familiar theme that the CIA did not inform the House and Senate committees of its aid to Nicaraguan democratic rebels mining Nicaragua's harbors last year.

In fact, both committees were

briefed by CIA Director William Casey and his aides. All House members understood what they were told but — as an angry letter by Sen. Goldwater revealed when it was "leaked" by a staff committee member — some Senate members did not.

Moynihan revealed in his farewell that CIA representatives later sought the disciplining of a committee staff member — presumably the source of the Goldwater letter.

A "grievous thing," laments Moynihan, that after eight years in which the CIA has offered its "honest counsel" to the two committees an attempt should have been made to "silence that counsel."

It is not the counsel, Senator, it is the leaks.

17 October 1984

Pg 1

The CIA and the Europeans

STAT

The American intelligence community is annoyed with the lukewarm European response to its allegations that the Soviet Union has violated the 1975 ban on biological and toxic weapons through the use of "yellow rain" and other deadly chemicals and toxins in Asia. Though it is stamped "secret", the conclusions of a top-level intelligence report on the issue has been made available to FOREIGN REPORT. It concludes that the European allies cannot be trusted to help the United States if it alleges that the Soviet Union has violated arms-control agreements.

The highest level of the intelligence community was involved in the report. It was issued by the director of central intelligence, William Casey, with the CIA as the lead agency. It had the agreement of the Defence Intelligence Agency; the National Security Agency; the intelligence organisations of the state and treasury departments; the army's assistant chief of staff for intelligence; the director of naval intelligence; the assistant chief of staff for air force intelligence; and the director of intelligence for the marines.

The American finding that the Soviet Union had violated the biological and toxic weapons convention "was made at the highest levels of the American government"; and the available evidence "has been steadily strengthened by confirmatory reporting and analysis", the report says. "Nevertheless, west European and other governments and publics have widely resisted fully accepting the published evidence", it adds. "Faced with what to do about a detected violation, those governments have exhibited great reluctance to react in a concerted and politically significant way".

Not wanting the allies to read this conclusion, the intelligence community stamped it "NoFORN", meaning "not releasable to foreign nationals", as well as "secret". The report reveals that the French and West German governments have secretly confirmed some of the American findings about yellow rain but will not say so publicly. The report adds:

Similar difficulties are likely to be encountered in other arms control compliance areas where technical intelligence findings are relied upon to validate a violation. The special nature and secrecy requirements of sensitive intelligence are such as to impose severe limitations on the availability of governments to present intelligence findings in a publicly compelling way.

The intelligence report says there was considerable European scepticism, particularly among a few vocal scientists, about the validity of the findings, and that media treatment had tended to increase the doubt and uncertainty. After the UN general assembly decided in 1980 to investigate allegations of the use of chemical warfare, "most governments felt relieved of any obligation to speak out on the issue", the report adds. France and Britain were willing to make public statements about chemical weapons only after the general assembly's report in 1982 stated that the investigators "could not ignore that there was evidence that such weapons might have been used in some cases".

In Nato, the European allies became more aware that the Soviet Union could use yellow rain in Europe in the event of war. "But constraints at the political level of Nato governments have sharply inhibited serious action", the report says.

Continued

Ideophobia — a threat to America's freedom of expression

RUSHWORTH M. KIDDER



In the natural world, animals respond to danger in various ways. Some run and hide. Some stand and fight. But some of the most awe-inspiring do neither. Lions, grizzlies, porcupines — they just don't seem to get threatened.

In the intellectual world, human beings have developed differing responses to the threat of discomfiting ideas. Some run and hide — imagining, in keeping with those once-popular see-no-evil-hear-no-evil monkey statuettes, that the unknown can't harm them. Others stand and fight — lashing out violently against all concepts foreign to their own.

But the most formidable do neither. Sure of their own strengths, they simply don't become threatened by ideas.

American democracy, with its emphasis on free speech, seems well fitted to produce citizens of the latter stripe — thinkers capable of assessing a wide range of ideas without feeling threatened by them. So it is particularly disturbing to see evidence from several quarters that ideophobia — the fear of ideas — is on the rise.

The signs come from both ends of the political spectrum. Last month in Washington, the Reagan administration came under fire at a conference on "free trade in ideas." Organized by the American Civil Liberties Union, it highlighted the increasing use of the McCarran-Walter Act (passed during the McCarthy era to keep communists out of the United States) to prevent certain foreign writers, editors, and speakers from entering the country. Under its provisions, Mexican historian Carlos Fuentes, South African poet Dennis Brutus, Colombian novelist Gabriel García Márquez, and Polish poet Czeslaw Milosz have at one time or another been denied entry because of their political beliefs. In 1983 the State Department refused visas to Nino Pasti, a former NATO general and Italian senator opposed to stationing Pershing and cruise missiles in Europe, and to Hortensia Allende, widow of the Chilean President. Both had been invited to speak to US groups. Last year, too, the Justice Department stamped a "political propaganda" label on three Canadian films dealing with nuclear war and acid rain before allowing them into the country.

The Reagan administration, however, has also been the victim of this resurgence of ideophobia. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger's talk at Harvard last fall

was so severely disrupted that he could barely complete it. Ditto for UN Ambassador Jeane J.

Kirkpatrick's talk earlier that year at Berkeley: She canceled a second speech and was asked to leave by students at Smith College from appearing as their commencement speaker. Three years ago a talk by Central

Intelligence Agency Director William Casey at Brown University was interrupted by students in the audience reading aloud from Lewis Carroll's poem "Jabberwocky."

These and similar incidents form the basis for a thoughtful essay by Harvard president Derek Bok on the question of free speech on campus, published last month in the Harvard University Gazette. "When," writes Mr. Bok, "is heckling an interference with free speech and when is it simply a means by which an audience communicates its disapproval?"

It is not a simple question, and Bok treads a judiciously middle course. The university administration is responsible, he rightly observes, for "maintaining an environment in which free expression and debate can flourish." But he warns that "free speech will not survive in an environment in which many people are indifferent to its existence or hostile to the expression of unpopular ideas." At heart, he says, lies the "critical question" all proponents of censorship must face: "Whom will we trust to censor communications?" And he quotes former University of California president Clark Kerr: "The university is not engaged in making ideas safe for students. It is engaged in making students safe for ideas."

True for universities — and true also for nations. The safety of the citizenry, as neo-censors on the left and right need to remember, is born not of fear of ideas but of courage in facing them. Does that mean there are no bad ideas? Not at all: Some are simply awful. But the leadership of a nation that values intellectual courage does not need to protect its would-be thinkers from bad ideas. It needs to encourage them to wrestle with them — to learn to discriminate between the good and the bad. It does not teach them to flee, or to lash out violently: It seeks instead to develop in its citizenry the serene confidence of mature judgment.

In the end, those who shout down Mr. Weinberger and those who shut out Sr. Fuentes are cut from the same cloth. They need to remember that Descartes's famous *Je pense, donc je suis* means "I think, therefore I am" — not "I think, therefore I fear."

A Monday column

PERSPECTIVES

FILE ONLY

WASHINGTON POST
14 October 1984ARTICLE APPENDED
OUTSIDE 6-BookWorld

Waste: A Capitol Crime

**WASHINGTON—
CITY OF SCANDALS**
Investigating Congress
And Other Big Spenders
By Donald Lambro
Little, Brown. 299 pp. \$18.95

By Morton Mintz

IS THERE a good bureaucrat who isn't a dead bureaucrat? A federal agency serving the public interest? A good regulation? These are rare birds in the aviary of Donald Lambro, the syndicated columnist and National Public Radio commentator who takes on government waste in *Washington—City of Scandals*.

Three sentences capture his message: Our government is of the people, by wastrel bureaucrats, and for wastrel bureaucrats. "Each wasted dollar, each nebulous or questionable program, each excessive expenditure, each needless regulation, each fraud or abuse, each counterproductive law is the result of the acts or negligence of Congress." "The national news media's reluctance to reveal the real government in Washington is a major reason why so many of the nebulous and unworkable activities of government have continued to exist and grow for so many years."

In turn, three more sentences sum up my view of the book: It is a useful compendium of facts about diverse, enormous, enduring and pervasive government waste and about related matters, such as the hypocrisy and laxity of officials and politicians who pose as enemies of waste. But Lambro offers few fresh analyses or insights and fewer deep thoughts, and many of his suggested remedies are unrealistic if not preposterous. Moreover, too many of his attitudes, claims and complaints are careless, conflicting, dubious, inaccurate, mean, petty, simplistic, superficial, uninformed and/or pointlessly biased.

Lambro does indeed make a valuable contribution by pointing out the following:

■ Congress' overall poor execution of its basic oversight function. One example: In 1982, the House Administration Commit-

tee's Services Subcommittee had three staff members and held two hearings on "improving the service in congressional barber-shops." By contrast, the Senate Appropriations defense subcommittee, "which has oversight responsibility for \$245 billion in expenditures, has only six staffers to examine the entire Pentagon establishment."

■ Congress' abuse of the franking privilege. "Just think of it," Sen. Charles McC. Mathias Jr. (R-Md.) has said. "We could televise the proceedings of the U.S. Senate for the next 100 years . . . with the money that we spend in a single year for senators' mass mailings."

■ Scandal and waste in the Interior Department's Bureau of Indian Affairs, which has spent more than \$1.1 billion since 1960 "while the social profile of the American Indian remains a national tragedy"; in the Synthetic Fuels Corp. ("the \$88 billion mistake"); and in the Government Printing Office.

■ The usually grim fate of whistleblowers.

Edward A. Curran became one and subsequently lost his job as director of the National Institute of Education, the \$53 million research arm of the Department of Education. Appalled by what he saw as the NIE's utter pointlessness, he wrote to President Reagan, using a specific code to get the letter past the palace guard and into the Oval Office. But the letter was somehow intercepted and Curran got into deep trouble with comments like, "The taxpayer simply does not need a \$99,000 survey on the political attitudes of college professors." Later, Lambro discussed the incident with Edwin Meese III. "What you are saying is that if you are a subordinate agency head and you have concluded that your program should be abolished because it is an unnecessary and wasteful bureaucracy, you should never under any circumstances communicate those views to the President?" he asked. "That's right," the Counselor to the President replied.

■ The successful campaign led by then-Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara and then-Rep. Chet Hollifield (D-Calif.) to stop Congress' General Accounting Office from nosing around in the books of military contractors and to give the job to the Defense Contract Audit Agency. The DCAA is, of course, in bondage to the Pentagon, which, too often, is a captive of the contractors.

■ The increases in non-military outlays sought by Reagan in the 1984 budget, including: \$3.3 billion more (15 percent) for the Transportation Department, \$1 billion

(28.5 percent) for the Farmers Home Administration, \$400 million each for the Justice Department (13.7 percent) and State Department (18 percent) and \$128 million (22.8 percent) for the U.S. Information Agency, and \$700,000 (18.4 percent) for the Executive residence.

■ A collection of cholesterol-rich items, such as: a Pentagon request for \$525,000 to remodel the bathrooms in 15 Army generals' homes at Fort Myer; former President Carter seeking a \$15,000 wool rug for his Atlanta office; a \$3,255 desk for the House Majority Whip, a \$2,136 desk for the Mi-

nority Whip; CIA Director William J. Casey's chauffeur's \$26,000 in overtime, and the rationale for chauffeuring Dr. Edward N. Brandt Jr., head of the Public Health Service, between his government-provided home and his government-provided office: he was traveling between government facilities, not just commuting.

HAVING made Congress the villain, Lambro fails to discharge a serious writer's obligation to explore why it behaves as it does. Nor does he begin to explain how he would convert the very institution he seems to despise into a broadsword to effect the reforms he proposes. The most absurd of his suggestions—intended to make existing programs work—is: "First, Congress should formally declare a four-year moratorium on any new legislation, except in cases of national emergency." What are the ramifications? He doesn't say.

On one page, when Lambro wants to portray legislators as swine at the public trough, Capitol Hill is a Versailles: "Picture, if you will, wealthy senators lunching in their restricted Capitol Hill dining rooms on tables covered in crisp linens, under crystal chandeliers, served by a well-paid staff of waitresses whose salaries (over \$4.10 an hour) exceed anything their counterparts earn in privately owned restaurants."

A few pages later, when he wants to show legislators as hypocrites for exempting Congress (themselves) from occupational safety and health and labor legislation, Versailles is a tenement: "In many offices, employees are crammed in desk-to-desk, sometimes in offices with no windows. There are poorly lit hallways, in some cases dangerously torn carpeting on building stairways, and other infirmarys that pose serious dangers to worker safety." And the "overpaid" waitresses here become exploited victims who can't unionize and "are required to work overtime without pay whenever Congress decides to work late."

ARTICLE APPEARED
IN
M-1WASHINGTON POST
14 October 1984

FILE ONLY

STAT

ART BUCHWALD

Blackballed, and Loving It

Newspaper people cannot live by bread alone. They have to have Walter Mitty fantasies to keep them going. My latest one has to do with last Sunday's debate. It was revealed before the confrontation that more than 100 names of media people had been submitted and rejected by either Mondale's or Reagan's advisers. I have to believe that I was one of the people on the list.

This is what I'm sure happened.

The hundred media names were sent over to Reagan headquarters.

One of Reagan's key aides recognized mine immediately.

"They have to be kidding!" the aide said to the president's debate staff. "According to our files this guy is one of the few people in America who is not better off today than he was four years ago."

"How did you find that out?"

"We talked to his wife."

"The man is relentless when it comes to asking the tough, trenchant questions."

"Not to mention his follow-ups. He'll go for the home run every time."

"It says he has no respect for the office of the presidency."

"Or Vice President Bush's tax returns."

"He drove Nixon out of the White House."

"I thought that was Woodward and Bernstein."

"Who do you think led them to the smoking gun?"

"Wait, maybe it's better to have the devil we know than the devil we don't."

"What the devil does that mean?"

"He'll ask Reagan a probing, in-depth question on urban housing, and then Ronnie will stammer and get the sympathy of the TV audience. People don't like to see someone beat up on their president during a debate, particularly when it comes to urban housing."

"It's too much of a risk. This guy is the foremost authority on sleaze in the country. I say cross him off the list."

"Tell the League of Women Voters if they put this Darwin-loving secular humanist on the panel, our man sleeps at Camp David on Sunday night."

My fantasy is not limited to the Reagan people. I prefer to believe the Mondale staff also flipped when they saw my name on the media list.

"This is outrageous. We can't have this guy questioning our candidate."

"Why? He seems awfully ignorant when it comes to the issues."

"The man's a closet Reaganite."

He wants the president in for four more years because he thinks Reagan will provide him with better columns than Mondale. I heard him say on the radio he has to think of himself before his country."

"If Fritz sees him on the panel, our candidate will lose all his confidence and forget to bring up Medicare, Beirut and the fairness issue."

"You have to watch out for the liberals. They'll stick it to their own every time."

"He's a wimp, and if there is one thing we don't want Sunday night it's someone who will ask Mondale where he stands on wimps in this campaign."

"The big question we should ask ourselves is, 'Is this guy better off today than he was four years ago?'"

"Are you kidding? He's made more money in the last four years off of Reagan than Bill Casey has made in the stock market."

"Let's tell the League of Women Voters if he sits down on the panel, Fritz is going to church that night."

Well, that's my big fantasy for this election year. Being blackballed by not one but both presidential candidates is every newspaper person's ultimate dream.

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ARTICLE
CHIEF C-1WASHINGTON TIMES
11 October 1984

ARNOLD BEICHMAN

Who runs the CIA?

The magnification of power and influence of the CIA career bureaucracy, represented by John J. McMahon, the CIA deputy director, over President Reagan's personal appointee, CIA Director William J. Casey, is the untold story of the Reagan administration. It is today a matter of legitimate doubt among highly informed observers that even President Reagan's orders to the CIA to undertake covert operations could prevail over a McMahon veto.

To obtain confirmation or denial of the foregoing statements is impossible; understandably, because the CIA rarely discusses for publication the organization's inner workings. However, persons in a position to know and observe the CIA and who are free of organizational inhibitions clearly believe that the CIA career service has achieved a degree of power unparalleled in the intelligence agency's 37-year existence.

The reason for the disagreement between Mr. Casey and the McMahon career bureaucracy is not that the Reagan-Casey ideas are so off the wall that Mr. McMahon and his aides must rescue CIA professionalism from the antics of political appointees. CIA professional judgments have in the past proven to be misjudgments. CIA analysts, it is now known, have over the years been spectacularly wrong in their underestimates of Soviet

armaments expenditures, while outside experts have been correct. The CIA permanent staff has never had a monopoly on wisdom.

The continuing Casey-McMahon disagreement is based on how best to implement Reagan policies via the CIA. The White House endeavor to push the CIA into a more activist role via covert-action programs seems thus far to have been frustrated.

For example, following Soviet destruction of the Korean Air Lines passenger plane in September 1983, President Reagan is said to have ordered Mr. Casey to retaliate against the U.S.S.R. by shipping a quantity of surface-to-air missiles to the embattled Afghan mujahideen battling the then four-year-old Soviet invasion. Mr. McMahon succeeded in preventing execution of the proposal, arguing that it would be too difficult to accomplish. He may have been right or wrong; whichever it was, Mr. McMahon's view prevailed.

Another example: Some 200 Soviet soldiers are known to be either prisoners or deserters in the hands of Afghan resistance fighters. Mr. Casey proposed, with President Reagan's support, bringing to the United States about 65 Soviet POWs for a mass press

conference. Such a move would have served two purposes:

First, it would have relieved the Afghans of a burden. POWs are generally a problem — what do you do with them? — in a guerrilla war characterized by hit-and-run tactics.

Second, such a prisoner show with Red Army soldiers telling their story to the world media might have been a stunning blow against Soviet imperial interests in Central Asia. Mr. McMahon vetoed the idea and his veto stuck. Again, Mr. McMahon might have been right or wrong; whichever it was, his view prevailed.

The CIA career bureaucracy

opposed from the outset the mining of Nicaragua waters. Whatever plan the McMahon forces finally offered for interdicting military supplies to Nicaragua failed to do the job, so, as the saying goes in Washington, it was "all onus and no bonus." The congressional uproar as a result of the mining is said to

have strengthened Mr. McMahon's position vis-a-vis Mr. Casey.

These are some of the passages in the continuing battle between the Casey CIA and the McMahon CIA, with permanent possession of the trophy seemingly in the hands of the CIA professionals, who have also managed to prevent any significant number of new Casey appointees from entering CIA

ranks. In fact, of five Casey executive appointees, only two remain and it is not certain how much influence they have in the organization today.

Whether this situation would change in the event of Director Casey's promised reappointment during a possible second Reagan term remains to be seen.

One of the major reasons for this power accretion to the CIA old-boy network is the formalization of congressional oversight of the intelligence agency in two select permanent committees of the Congress. Dissenters within the CIA from Reagan-Casey covert action proposals now have a forum where their dissent can be heard and debated inside the committees.

Instead of the usual hierarchical arrangements within a government department, there are now lateral CIA staff connections with Congress which has institutionalized its constitutional power to oversee the executive branch. Until the mid-1970s, congressional oversight of the CIA was informal. This function was pretty much left in the hands of ranking members of senior congressional committees who, themselves, in the good old Allen Dulles days, preferred not to probe too deeply into what the CIA was doing. As a result of House and Senate investigations in the aftermath of Watergate, Congress successfully asserted its power over the intelligence agency.

There are those, however, who disagree with this analysis. They counter-argue that the problem lies not with the congressional committees but with Director Casey himself. The incumbent has not exercised his own power to the same degree as did Adm. Stanfield Turner, President Carter's CIA director, who, as one observer said, "whether you agreed with him or not, ran the CIA."

Watergate, the Nixon resignation and the short-lived Ford adminis-

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DIRECTOR WILLIAM CASEY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
1820 FORT MYER RD
ARLINGTON VA 22209

THIS IS COPY OF MAILGRAM SENT TO THE PRESIDENT OF ABC NEWS, NEW YORK,
NEW YORK:

GENTLEMEN:

THIS IS TO REFUTE PREVIOUS BROADCASTS BY ABC AP AND UPI AND OTHER
NEWS STORIES REGARDING THE CIA ASSINATION PLOT AGAINST RON REWALD. I
IRREVOKABLY DENY ANY INVOLVEMENT AT ANY TIME WITH THE CIA AND I
REFUTE ALL STORIES THAT HAVE RECENTLY COME OUT. IN ADDITION I ALSO
DENY AND REFUTE PREVIOUS STORIES OF MY INVOLVEMENT WITH THE CIA ON
ANY AND ALL ASSINATION PLOTS AND ALLEGATIONS OF THIS NATURE. I CONCUR
WITH DIRECTOR WILLIAM CASEY ON THIS ENTIRE MATTER.
SINCERELY

SCOTT T BARNES

19:23 EST

MGMCOMP

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE C-2

WASHINGTON POST
8 October 1984

STAT

LAWYERS

ED BRUSKE

Nomination on Back Burner

One loser in the congressional shuffle was the CIA's chief counsel, Stanley Sporkin, whose nomination for a judgeship on U.S. District Court here never made it to Senate hearings. The nomination was sent back to White House until after the presidential elections.

It seems that Sporkin, former top enforcer for the Securities and Exchange Commission, made some enemies in the business community, reports correspondent *Philip Smith*. Some conservative senators didn't think Sporkin leaned far enough to the right and others did not appreciate the arm-twisting being done by CIA Director *William Casey* on Sporkin's behalf.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-8WASHINGTON POST
8 October 1984

STAT

The First-Term Cast Would Probably Play in the Sequel

In the days when Ronald Reagan was typecast as a B-movie actor, Hollywood followed a simple casting formula that Reagan never forgot.

The formula, which saved time and creative thought, was to make a sequel of any commercially successful movie, preferably using the same cast. Reagan and many others wound up in some real clunkers that way, including four films in which he played an improbable Secret Service agent named Brass Bancroft.

In real life, Reagan has stuck to the same basic script since he first ran for governor of California in 1966. Aspiring to be a two-term president, he is still running against government and its supposed waste, fraud and abuse. Over the years, his supporting cast has changed from time to time but has always included a trusted and identifiable cadre from Reagan's formative years as governor.

In the absence of specifics from the White House, Reagan's habits of sticking to old scripts and the same team provide the most useful clues to what is likely to happen in a second term.

In the first term, with no one making a point of it, some of the new crowd became a part of the old. Within the White House, chief of staff James A. Baker III and Reagan's closest aide, deputy chief of staff Michael K. Deaver, formed a firm alliance that ultimately disposed of all rivals. By all accounts, Reagan is now comfortable with Baker, who once managed the presidential campaigns of Gerald R. Ford and George Bush, and with most of the people Baker has brought on board.

There are right-wingers organizing against Baker, a chief of staff they regard with about as much affection as they do Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko. Their opposition isn't likely to sway Reagan, who understandably resents the suggestion that he is the captive of a liberal cabal.

By any normal definition, the struggle within the Reagan administration has been between conservatives who differ on process rather than on goals. Reagan recognized as much two years ago, during a period of White House feuding, when he cracked that his administration was one where "the right hand doesn't know what the far-right hand is doing."

Lou Cannon REAGAN & CO.

Ideology aside, the conventional wisdom in Washington is that Reagan, if reelected, would have a short "window of opportunity" to accomplish something in the honeymoon phase of a second term and a large "window of vulnerability" thereafter. He would be a lame duck at the moment of reelection. His chances for political success would diminish as mid-term elections

approached and could vanish if economic recession replaced economic recovery.

This argument that Reagan must strike quickly is also an argument against a new cast. Keeping Baker and his team, with their experience and political skills, would enable Reagan to avoid on-the-job training in the honeymoon phase and be quick off the mark in dealing with Congress. This argument is likely to be even more appealing if Deaver, chairman of the shadow inaugural committee, decides that it is finally time for him to take a more lucrative job outside the White House.

Nor are large changes foreseen in a Cabinet that, with a few conspicuous exceptions, has earned a reputation for mediocrity. Reagan is not one to emulate the example of Richard M. Nixon and ask for everyone's resignation so he can shuffle the political deck.

In large measure, it is the cast that determines the performance. Keeping Baker would be an augury of budget compromise. Keeping Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger, who can probably stay as long as he wants, is a sign that arms-control agreements with the Soviet Union will not come easily in a second term. Keeping William J. Casey as CIA director, as Reagan has promised to do, and U.N. Ambassador Jeane J. Kirkpatrick in a high-level post, as Reagan desires, are signs that he will not abandon his goals in Central America.

and term he has yet to win. In deference, White House and campaign aides ritually warn each other not to become overconfident. After a rare prediction of victory at a Gulfport, Miss., rally last week, the president returned the next day to his bromide that "President Dewey warned me not to get overconfident."

Behind the scenes, however, the stars and bit players of the first term are casting for the sequel at the White House. If Reagan wins, it's likely that you'll recognize both the plot and the players.

SECRET D-6

WASHINGTON POST
7 October 1984

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

STAT

Politicization of the CIA

Is the CIA being politicized?

Bob Woodward ["Aides Dispute CIA's 'Near-Destruction'," Sept. 28] quoted CIA Director William J. Casey as saying in a letter to Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, "You have my assurance that I will not tolerate any attempt to politicize the agency or its work, or use the fact of its revitalization for partisan political purposes."

Elsewhere in The Post on Sept. 28, Joanne Omang ["Analyst Says He Quit CIA When Casey Altered his Report to Support Policy"] reports that CIA's highly respected top Latin American analyst, John Horton, resigned rather

than alter an intelligence estimate to meet Mr. Casey's demand that the estimate support administration policy.

Sen. Moynihan and Sen. Barry Goldwater have joined forces to introduce legislation that would require that future CIA directors and deputy directors be intelligence professionals. This is an excellent move. The two senators should go further. They should immediately call in Mr. Casey and ask him about Mr. Horton's accusation. We may find the wrong man resigned.

Chevy Chase

CHARLES TABER

101 Unethical Individuals'

STAT

Colorado's Schroeder Issues a 'Hit List'

By MIKE STALLARD

Hardly a week goes by in the Capitol during which someone doesn't conjure up a political "hit list" of some kind, either to embarrass or revenge someone or something. Likewise, allegations about personal wrongdoing or unethical conduct are flung about with such abandon as to leave barely a soul untouched. That's life in Washington, and most folks just ignore it for what it normally is: otherwise unoccupied minds attached to restless tongues.

But recently Rep. Patricia Schroeder (D.-Colo.) issued a political hit list that has established a new standard of nonsense for this type of soap-box thumping.

In a written statement presented to the Subcommittee on Human Resources and its chairman, Rep. Donald Albosta (D.-Mich.), Schroeder issued a list of "101 unethical individuals in the Reagan Administration" and their misdeeds. The supposed purpose of the testimony was to support strengthening the Ethics in Government Act, now being considered by the subcommittee. Even those stumbling around in the thick partisan fog of Washington will see that missing step in the staircase, however.

The documents dispenses with pretense quickly when in the *first* paragraph the liberal Democrat from Denver observes that "...more and more disclosures that top Administration officials have run afoul of ethical restrictions have filled the newspapers."

While still in the introduction, she plugs the proposed changes by noting, "Today, in the face of the 'Debategate' scandal and the questionable ethical practices by many Reagan appointees, it is necessary to once again strengthen the ethics law."

Elsewhere in the statement, the former attorney footnotes the source for her 101 indictments: "These charges involve instances of criminal wrongdoing, abuse of power and privilege, and improper behavior by officials in the Reagan Administration.

The allegations described come from newspaper reports."

Some of the congresswoman's charges look more like items suited for "People's Court," rather than congressional testimony.

Schroeder bends credibility to the breaking point when she goes after a few well-aided cases where she *refutes by allegation* the findings of official government investigators, the FBI, and others. She finds guilty, in spite of all evidence to the contrary, people who have already paid dearly in good name.

* * * * *

"Max Hugel...CIA, allegedly... fraudulent stock dealing...." Yet never formally charged with anything since he left the government in 1981. [Editor's note: On September 26, Hugel was awarded a \$980,000 defamation judgment against the two men who made the original 1981 allegations.]

Schroeder attacks CIA Director William J. Casey with special fury. On the *first* page of her tale of sin she claims that the chief spook is the "unquestioned champion of ethical wrongdoing in this, or probably any, Administration."

Good grief! One scarcely knows where to begin with that one. You mean poor ol' Bill is worse, say, than Bobby Baker (or, for that matter, his boss)?

The main evidence of his depravity, according to the congresswoman, is that he "...failed to list more than \$250,000 in investment, \$500,000 in liabilities, names of 70 legal clients, four civil suits against him, and a number of corporations and foundations on whose boards he served on his *financial disclosure forms*." (Emphasis added.)

There's more. "Mr. Casey has also been accused of perjury in connection with his denial of involvement in stealing the briefing books...." This clever twist is added in spite of a recent congressional report, thicker than *War and Peace* and costing basketsful of money, that proved absolutely nothing except that if wishes were horses, Mrs. Schroeder and her buddies would own a stable.

* * * * *

EXCERPTED

Standing tall in Congress

STAT

The people of western Massachusetts who sent Edward P. Boland to Congress ought to be proud. Boland stood tall yesterday for principle in American foreign policy, refusing to knuckle under to Administration pressure to authorize continued funding for the CIA's illegal war against Nicaragua.

The "covert" war was the last sticking point in the House-Senate conference committee, trying to reach agreement on a half-trillion-dollar continuing resolution for fiscal year 1985, so that congressmen can go home to campaign for re-election.

"We're not going to agree to the Senate position and strip out the restrictive language," Boland said. "We are not going to. And the Senate ought to understand that."

It was the same unflamboyant but tough position Boland has taken for nearly two years — since he came to the conclusion, as chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, that CIA operations against Nicaragua had passed the bounds of reason, decency and law.

Boland is a strong backer of the intelligence agencies when they confine their activities to intelligence-gathering. He also initially favored clandestine operations inside Nicaragua when they were portrayed as efforts to interdict "arms traffic" to El Salvador. But when it became evident that the contra mercenary army organized by CIA Director William Casey was really attempting to overthrow the government of a sovereign state, in contravention of international law and the US Constitution, he balked.

This produced the Boland amendment, which has passed the House four times but failed in the Senate. It is loophole-free language designed to bar the channeling of any funds through the CIA or any other government agency to continue the war.

The struggle resumes on Tuesday. Backed by Speaker O'Neill, the Massachusetts delegation and principled congressmen of both parties, Boland can be expected to continue to stand tall by standing fast.

4 October 1984

FILE ONLY

Politics Shouldn't Taint the CIA's Analyses

Amid last week's argument about whether the Central Intelligence Agency had been gutted by the Carter administration, a former CIA intelligence analyst complained that one of his reports had been doctored to suit the political aims of the agency's present director, William Casey.

That's a serious charge, and it merits careful investigation.

The analyst, John Horton, resigned last May as a Latin American specialist for the National Intelligence Council, which coordinates the drafting of intelligence evaluations from the CIA, FBI, National Security Agency, State Department, Defense Intelligence Agency and intelligence units of the various armed forces. The council is headed by Casey.

Horton, who spent nearly 30 years with the CIA, had prepared a detailed analysis of conditions in Mexico. Casey returned it, Horton said, "because he wanted it to come out a certain way . . . There was constant pressure on me to redo it . . . I refused to do it, so he finally had the thing rewritten over my dead body, so to speak." And Horton quit.

One speculation was that Casey wanted the report to provide a more alarmist view so the White House would lean harder on Mexico to bring its policies on Central America closer to Washington's.

If that was Casey's plan, it apparently didn't work. In any case, tinkering with intelligence analyses for political reasons taints the information that is supposed to form the factual basis for policy decisions.

Earlier, another former CIA employee accused Casey of slanting intelligence information to support administration policies in Central America.

It's not easy to prove or disprove charges like these because most of the relevant information is classified. But the potential damage to this country's security from ineffective or even counterproductive policies adopted on the basis of slanted analyses should persuade the congression-

al intelligence committees to examine political influence on intelligence gathering.

And Congress should seriously consider adopting legislation introduced last week by Sens. Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.) and Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-N.Y.). It would require that future CIA directors and deputy directors be chosen from among career civilian or military intelligence personnel — thus precluding political appointments. While that's not a guarantee against politically motivated analyses, it should help reduce the temptation to doctor data.

ARTICLE 100-100-100-1
CHANGE **A-1**WASHINGTON TIMES
3 October 1984

Letters

Blaming U.S. first

It is 1984, and Silly Think is abroad in the land. Arthur W. Stier's letter of Sept. 10 puts the Soviets in second place to the U.S. in matters of disinformation. This is another example of support for that outrageous postulation that President Reagan, Secretary George Shultz, Secretary Caspar Weinberger, CIA Director William Casey, NASA and the Korean Airlines all conspired together to risk the lives of a planeload of innocent, unknowing people so as to obtain intelligence information which we already have or are capable of getting by other means.

It brings to mind Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick's speech before the convention: "But they *always* blame America first."

J.M. JOYNER
Saratoga, Calif.

BALTIMORE SUN
3 October 1984

FILE ONLY.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 184

STAT



"We're Always Believed In Your Integrity, Ray — Right, Boys?"

BOSTON GLOBE
2 October 1984

FILE ONLY

STAT

Embarrassing the President

By Robert Healy
Globe Staff

WASHINGTON - Last year in Bal Harbour, Fla., where the AFL-CIO executive committee met with Democratic candidates for President, a rump group led by Teddy Gleason of the East Coast longshoremen's union, held a dinner for Labor Secretary Raymond J. Donovan. There, Donovan bowed to the plaudits of the labor crowd and made a speech about the trials he had undergone and the problems they had caused him and his family.

A White House aide, told a few days later that Donovan was talking freely of his problems, said: "If Ray had any brains, he would save the President a great deal of embarrassment and resign."

Last night that embarrassment was placed at the doorstep of the White House with the announcement of Donovan's indictment on charges of grand larceny and maintaining false records when he was head of a construction company. He said last night that President Ronald Reagan had granted him a leave of absence until the matter has been resolved.

Donovan will be asked to surrender at the Bronx County Courthouse in New York for arraignment today, just five weeks before Reagan stands for re-election Nov. 6.

In addition to being embarrassing for Reagan, Donovan's indictment also raises questions about the process involved in using independent federal prosecutors. Such a prosecutor, Leon Silverman, investigated allegations against the Labor Secretary in 1982 and twice concluded that there was no "credible evidence" for charges to be filed.

Democratic sources said last night that the indictment might "cast a cloud" over the investigation into 11 allegations against Edwin Meese 3d, Reagan's counselor, whose nomination for Attorney General has been stalled before the Senate.

On Sept. 20, after a five-month inquiry into Meese's dealings, another independent investigator, Jacob A. Stein, found no basis for bringing any criminal charges. Some of the allegations against Meese stemmed from the fact that he had financial dealings with people who received federal jobs while he was in the White House, and that he had failed to disclose on his financial forms a \$15,000, interest-free loan to his wife.

While Stein found no basis for prosecution, he said his mandate did not permit him to evaluate Meese's fitness on ethical grounds to serve as Attorney General.

An even larger problem for Reagan is that with only five weeks to go in the campaign, Donovan's indictment raises the so-called "sleaze" issue anew: the term refers to the forced resignations of a number of top people in the Administration.

Those include deputy defense secretary Paul Thayer, who left office after an apparent conflict-of-interest case; about 20 of the top officials in the Environmental Protection Agency who were forced to resign or were dismissed in a scandal involving the use of the Superfund cleanup program, and Richard Allen, who resigned as national security adviser after taking gifts from people for whom he arranged White House access.

None of these scandals has touched the President himself, and he has not been implicated in any of them. And national polls show they have not led to any lack of public confidence in the way he or his appointees have conducted the Administration's business. Partly as a result of this, and partly because his own misstatements do not seem to hurt his appeal, his political opponents have labeled his the "Teflon presidency."

The Donovan episode might well spur the Democrats to renew their attacks, however, and bring up other potential embarrassments for the Administration - including Max Hugel, who was forced out of a CIA appointment after allegations of improper stock transactions, and CIA director William Casey, whose personal finances Democrats have repeatedly questioned because he invested in areas covered by CIA reports.

It might also work for the Democrats in the so-called "fitness" issue, whether Reagan is in touch with what is going on in the Administration.

In light of the third bombing of US facilities in Lebanon, for which the President has been catching considerable heat from Walter F. Mondale, the Donovan issue is something the Administration did not need politically.

It is a problem as old as this Administration and does not seem to go away.

Don't Blame Me

Kitchen Remodelling and Other Excuses

STAT

Chicago.
WE HAVE just seen why the president's keepers wave off questions, curtail press sessions and simply refuse to call press conferences. Given a serious matter to talk about, Ronald Reagan will — under questioning — say things silly or false or both.

The serious matter was the death of Americans in Lebanon

By Garry Wills

who were under his care and were not protected, despite ample advance warning that they were targets. The president's first remark was to claim that anyone who remodels a kitchen knows it is hard to get the task finished on time.

What would we say of his own Secret Service protectors if they left the president's life exposed, and afterward adopted the kitchen-remodeling defense? The mere likening of their task to such a casual effort, with its incidental annoyances, would show they had no worthy conception of their duty.

Is the president less duty-bound to protect citizens he has committed to a dangerous situation than are the guards who surround him? Other lives become kitchen appliances to a man who had already lost, prior to this last bombing, 276 American lives in combat areas. When does he begin to realize that a battle zone is not a leaking faucet?

The president's next comment on the matter was even worse. The reporters were sealed off from him, but a college student got to him with a question, and he said that American lives were lost because his predecessors of "recent years" were guilty of "destruction of our intelligence capacity" because they felt that "spying is somehow dishonest."

Where does one begin to analyze an assertion so breathtakingly false when it is not irrelevant?

Don't blame me, the president said; blame the nameless men who betrayed their high trust before I arrived. His aides went drearily about their customary task after he has slipped their controls — denying as much as they could of the statement, altering the rest, spreading its meaning, hoping to make it meaningless so no one would notice how McCarthyite the meaning of it is.

The argument was irrelevant because Mr. Reagan said it is the job of intelligence "to know in advance what the target might be." Everyone knew who the target was — not might be — in Lebanon. There was no failure of intelligence, just repeated failures of protection.

No one in authority ever acted on the view that "spying is dishonest." Some abuses were criticized, though only partly amended, as the result of a Republican administration's study under Gerald Ford. Some reduction of the CIA was made possible — indeed, necessary — by the ending of the Vietnam War.

But the destruction of the CIA is going forward now in ways that did not occur even under Richard Nixon. Nixon kept demanding from the CIA and FBI intelligence estimates that reflected his views, rather than independent observation — for example, that demonstrations in America were being funded from abroad. The agencies resisted that pressure.

Mr. Reagan asserts the same thing Nixon did, with no better evidence, and pays no attention to the agencies on this matter. He has Mr. Casey to do that — who has driven out two top analysts already because they would not make their findings reflect a prior policy commitment emanating from the White House. Those are the pressures that undermine the independence, accuracy and efficacy of intelligence units; and they have never been stronger than under a man who, in cowardly manner, calls his predecessors

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-1WASHINGTON POST
1 October 1984

Shultz Hits Security Criticism

Embassy Bombing Issue Still Dogging Administration

By John M. Goshko
Washington Post Staff Writer

Secretary of State George P. Shultz yesterday took angry exception to the idea that "somebody's head has to roll" for the Sept. 20 bombing of the U.S. Embassy annex in Beirut, saying, "I'm willing to have it be my head anytime anyone wants."

Shultz, who is noted for a normally softspoken and even-tempered manner, reacted with uncharacteristic emotion as questions about whether there was lax security at the embassy continued to dog the Reagan administration.

Democratic presidential nominee Walter F. Mondale charged yesterday that President Reagan, despite his denials, had tried to put the blame on past administrations for allegedly weakening the CIA's ability to collect intelligence.

"Presidential leadership means being accountable for events that occur on your watch," Mondale said in his weekly paid radio speech. "There was not a failure of American intelligence; there was a failure to use it wisely."

Shultz became visibly upset when questioned on "This Week With David Brinkley" (ABC, WJLA) about how terrorists had been able to carry out their third major attack against Americans in Lebanon within 17 months. He replied sharply:

"There is somehow this notion that in response to this, somebody's head has to roll. Well maybe so. And I'm willing to have it be my head anytime anyone wants . . . I certainly feel responsible. Absolutely. And I take that responsibility very seriously.

"Just you listen to me now—I feel so strongly about this," he said when questioners tried to interrupt. "The people out there in Beirut are serving our country in a risky environment . . . and they are doing everything possible to improve their security and it's up to us to help them

"There is an investigation . . . If there was negligence, we'll find it. But we're not in this investigation business to see if we can knock somebody's head off. Our purpose is to find out what additional we can do to enhance the security of our embassies. That's the bull on which we need to keep our eye."

Shultz's testy exchange with his interviewers followed a week in which the Beirut bombing has become a subject of increasingly partisan exchanges between Republicans and Democrats.

At one point, Reagan appeared to be blaming former president Jimmy Carter's administration for allegedly weakening the CIA. But after demurrers from CIA Director William J. Casey and Vice President Bush, who headed the agency in the mid-1970s, the administration said Reagan's remark had been misinterpreted, and Reagan called Carter to explain.

Mondale yesterday called the idea that previous administrations were to blame "false, misguided and dangerous. It is not true that the CIA was weakened during the late 1970s, as Mr. Reagan's own vice president and CIA director have admitted."

"It is reckless to announce that American intelligence is so weak that we cannot protect ourselves from terrorists," said Mondale, who was Carter's vice president. "That invites further assaults. It jeopardizes the security of our personnel and installations abroad."

Bush, at a news conference in Parma, Ohio, yesterday, said Reagan would "probably" take responsibility for the bombing, if necessary, but added that such terrorist attacks are "extraordinarily difficult to guard against," United Press International reported.

In addition to the injection of the bombing issue into the presidential campaign, there have been

tions that groups within the administration are trying to extricate themselves from suspicion of laxity by shifting the blame to rival agencies. STAT

Some State Department officials said that might have been a factor in prompting Shultz's angry remarks.

Department officials are known to be particularly incensed at the

leak to the press, immediately after the bombing, of a Defense Intelligence Agency report citing security deficiencies at the embassy annex. State Department officials said privately that the report contained no information of which they were unaware and added that, although it had been completed two weeks before the bombing, they had been unable to obtain a copy from the DIA.

As a result, many department officials are known to feel that the leak was an attempt by elements within the Defense Department, and possibly the CIA, to make it appear that the blame rests solely with the State Department and embassy personnel in Beirut.

Shultz, in his remarks yesterday, pointedly called the U.S. ambassador there, Reginald Bartholomew, "a hero." The secretary said Bartholomew had "come close to getting killed three times."

In response to questions about Reagan's meeting Friday with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko, Shultz reiterated the administration's contention that the meeting had resulted in an important agreement "to keep in touch . . . carefully and systematically through diplomatic channels." As a result, Shultz added, "we hope we can negotiate out some important things" like a resumption of arms control talks in the months ahead.

Shultz dismissed as "just nonsense" a Washington Post article yesterday that said the White House had kept arrangements for Gromyko's visit secret to prevent the Defense Department from torpedoing the meeting. "The Defense Department was completely involved in the preparations," he said, although he acknowledged that in the early planning stages "the president kept it to himself and a few other people."

Continued

ARTICLE APPEARED
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The CIA and truth

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IN today's world the United States is required to be able to gather intelligence swiftly and accurately about the activities of potentially hostile nations or groups abroad.

Yet intelligence-gathering activities have their limitations: Security for US installations overseas must go well beyond the collection of information. In areas of risk, such as Lebanon and other nations of the Mideast, adequate security should include properly trained armed guards, such as US marines, and sturdy gates and other barriers capable of keeping bomb-laden trucks out of embassy grounds.

In the Mideast the general threat to US facilities and individual Americans is both public and self-evident. No intelligence-gathering capacity is necessary to know that.

What is required are much stronger security measures than had been taken to protect the now-bombed annex to the US Embassy in east Beirut.

It was unhelpful for the Reagan administration to insinuate that the responsibility for the bombing lay with past, Democratically controlled Congresses and presidential administrations — with presidential aides evidently pointing to the Carter administration — on grounds that they had trimmed the CIA's intelligence-gathering activities. The potential of threat to the embassy annex was well known; it needed security, not intelligence gathering.

The American public has already made up its mind as to responsibility in Lebanon. A Harris survey taken after the bombing found a nearly 4-to-1 majority

saying the attack was a serious setback for the US, with a 3-to-1 majority calling the administration policy in Lebanon a failure.

The administration's loose rhetoric on the question of embassy security is unfortunate. It cannot be permitted to embitter the bipartisan context for intelligence activities.

Intelligence gathering, like effective foreign policy in general, requires bipartisan support if it is to have the long-term backing, in and out of government, necessary for a good job to be performed. The president, whoever is in office, must have sound, accurate, and up-to-date information about many areas of the globe.

That is why it is disturbing to learn of the controversy involving the accuracy of a CIA report on Mexico. According to printed reports, the analyst who prepared it resigned in protest after having been told by the CIA director, William Casey, to revise his report so that it provided support for the administration's Latin America policy. If the printed stories are accurate, the evidence in effect was to be altered to fit a predetermined conclusion.

That is precisely what the role of intelligence gathering should *not* be. Rather, it should produce the raw material on which policy is based. The success of American foreign policy depends, in part, on the accuracy of the intelligence and analyses upon which it is based.

To say the least, it would be exquisitely difficult to base a successful policy on information tailored, for whatever reason, to what someone thinks national leaders want to hear.

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1 October 1984ARTICLE APPEARED
10

STAT

A failure of brains, not eyes

President Reagan is trying to blame the bombing of the U.S. embassy annex in Beirut on damage he says was done to American intelligence agencies during the Carter administration. He's wrong in so many ways it isn't easy to sort them all out.

First, the attack on the annex in Beirut did not come without warning. American intelligence had picked up signs of trouble brewing and had passed them on. Maybe not the license number of the bomb-laden vehicle or the precise time of day the attack would come, but it did not take a superspy to suspect that if the terrorists struck they might do it the way they had twice before since President Reagan took office.

Within days of the bombing of a U.S. Senate corridor last fall, barricades designed to stop car bombers were installed at the White House, the Capitol, the U.S. mission at the United Nations in New York and at other government facilities around the world. It falls to Mr. Reagan—not Mr. Carter, Lyndon Johnson or Grover Cleveland—to explain why something like that was not in place in Beirut.

Perhaps the warnings of danger were not acted upon because intelligence agencies today—as they have since man first began to spy—too often cry wolf. But if there was a failure of intelligence here, it was not for want of eyes. Brainpower and judgment maybe, but not eyes.

Then there is Mr. Reagan's curious idea of history. The intelligence agencies did go

through a disastrous period, but you can't say it was limited to the Carter administration. Nor can you blame it solely on Democrats.

Sure, former President Carter must take responsibility for the demoralization of the Central Intelligence Agency under Admiral Stansfield Turner. It was the lowest point in the agency's 37 years of service.

But this was only the culmination of a long process. The intelligence agencies were victims of post-Watergate skepticism and their own failures, over decades, to subject their conduct to the applicable legal rules. For decades the agencies had operated in a dream world in which they thought law and public opinion had no force.

They learned otherwise, and it damaged U.S. intelligence capacities. If any single president is to bear a disproportionate part of the blame for this, it would be Richard Nixon, not Jimmy Carter. It was the Nixon administration's extension of the principles of deceit and lawlessness that finally brought the whole thing down.

If President Reagan wants to look for intelligence failures, he ought to be worrying about more recent problems—the repeal of rules designed to keep intelligence activities in line with what the American public and legal order can tolerate, and CIA Director William Casey's habit of rewriting agency analyses to fit the White House's ideological preconceptions. It is President Reagan's intelligence network. He is responsible for it, just as he is responsible for whatever went wrong in Beirut.

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

October 1, 1984

The Honorable William Casey
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505

INTELLIGENCE, CHAIRMAN
ARMED SERVICES
TACTICAL WARFARE, CHAIRMAN
PREPAREDNESS
STRATEGIC AND THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCES
COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
COMMUNICATIONS, CHAIRMAN
AVIATION
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Dear Bill:

It's just a matter of days now, until this Congress is ended and, with it, so will end my Chairmanship of the Intelligence Committee.

I just wanted to take these few minutes to tell you how very much I have enjoyed working with you and, at times, for you. I'm a tremendous believer in intelligence but I am an old fashioned person; I don't believe intelligence is the property of just anybody who comes along. I'd like to see intelligence in our country be the property of the intelligence community and the President of the United States, the Joint Chiefs, the National Security Council and the Congress only, I repeat, only, when it is needed.

I don't think I will get to see that. I've argued for it but to no avail. I'm afraid both committees, the House and the Senate, have now so spoiled the members that they think they're entitled to every little bit of information. I think that will explain to you why I never have come out to the CIA to harass you or to talk with you or to talk to the people under you. I've always felt that it's your property, the intelligence family's property, and not mine.

I have enjoyed being with you. I think you've done a heck of a good job and you've certainly brought the intelligence group a long way up the road that the Church committee darned near destroyed you on. Through you, will you please give my thanks to all of those people who work under you, with you and for you and for all of us, for the great job they are doing.

I appreciate it as an American citizen, not just as a United States Senator.

With all good wishes to you,


Barry Goldwater

READERS DIGEST
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ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 84

STAT

Solving the Plot to Kill the Pope

An authorized report by DAVID SIMPSON

One intrepid journalist refused to believe that John Paul II's would-be assassin was a loner and a crackpot. Here is the inside story of her dogged investigation and its appalling conclusions.

ON May 13, 1981, in St. Peter's Square, a 23-year-old Turk named Mehmet Ali Agca held a Browning 9-mm. semiautomatic over his head in classic terrorist form, and shot and seriously

THE KILLING OF THE ASSASSIN. COPYRIGHT © 1984 BY CLARE STEINBERG. ILLUSTRATION BY HOLT RINEHART AND WINSTON. 300 MADISON AVE., NEW YORK, N.Y. 10017

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The two Reagans

(and one vote for Mondale)

WASHINGTON — For four years we have had a President who has on occasion risen to heights of leadership, oratory and inspiration and as often sunk to being a talking department-store dummy on casters — wheeled around by clever, manipulative image-makers who tell him what to say.

Roll him into a McDonald's for a campaign shot: "What am I supposed to order?" the President of the United States asks.

The question voters face on Tuesday is which of these two men Ronald Reagan is likely to be for the next four years: The strong, inspiring leader who claims to have brought America back together again or the bewildered figurehead who needs somebody at his side to whisper, "Big Mac, sir"?

Ronald Reagan has many virtues: He led an assault on social programs that had run amok. He made even liberals like Walter Mondale question basic assumptions about bureaucratized do-goodism, financed by taxes on the middle class. He forced down inflation by throwing millions of people out of work.

He has made America seem a stable, predictable place where foreigners can safely invest their money — thus subsidizing his unprecedented national deficits. He has been an amiable, colorful, humorous, likable national leader.

But there have also been moments of quiet horror — in press conferences in the East Room of the White House, during the televised debates with Mondale — when this 73-year-old man has teetered precariously on the outer edge of his intellect as he struggled with a question. I have been there; every heart in the room stops as you watch your President wobble on the brink of intellectual disintegration, a blank look in his eyes and incoherent words on his lips.

It is impossible to predict how Reagan will hold up over the next four years, how hard he will do his homework, how much effort he will put into the dirty work



Lars-Erik Nelson

of running the government, as opposed to the pleasant task of waving and smiling at the country. The evidence points to lots of smiles and waves.

Who, then, will do the thinking for him? Who will be around him to whisper "Big Mac, sir"? They are an undistinguished, even cynical lot.

Vice President George Bush has, for all his other qualities, reduced the level of American political discourse to the writing on a men's room wall. Bush's idea of advising the President is: "You're absolutely right, sir."

Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger is the lawyer for the military. Whatever the Pentagon wants, he argues its case, then takes it to Reagan to sell it. These people are deploying a dangerous nuclear missile, the MX, in vulnerable silos as a sign to the Russians of our "national will." This is not military strategy; this is the tough-guy lunacy of Watergate burglar G. Gordon Liddy, impressing girlfriends by

holding his hand over a candle flame until the flesh burned — as a demonstration of his will.

Secretary of State George Shultz has been numbingly naive and unimaginative, painstakingly negotiating a Middle East peace agreement that was liable at any time to be vetoed by Syria. When the Syrians did indeed veto it, Shultz said in surprise, "But they promised . . ." And Israel remains stuck in Lebanon.

Treasury Secretary Donald Regan sees no connection between the federal deficit and interest rates. The deficits will go away by themselves, poof. Interest rates will fall. Regan majored in English at Harvard, not economics.

CIA Director William Casey has been caught more times than any superspy in history — deceiving the Congress and misleading his own President about the "secret war" in Nicaragua, making money off stocks while in office.

BECAUSE OF his docile acceptance of the role of national salesman for whatever these 40-watt bulbs recommend, Reagan has not been a President in the traditional sense. He has shirked real governmental leadership, and he has ducked responsibility for his failures.

He takes spiritual and moral advice from a minority fringe of primitive Christians and would enforce their religious views on the rest of the nation — even though he does not believe or practice those views himself.

The polls show that Reagan is leading in almost all of the 50 states. If he is what the people really want, so be it. But if he wins reelection, it will be without my vote. Go on, tell me it's hopeless; I'm punching my ballot for Mondale.

The Great Superpower Spy War

KGB vs. CIA

Money, blackmail, sex—no holds are barred. Question: Who is winning this battle between Soviet and American “moles”?

With the arrest of the first FBI agent ever accused as a Soviet spy, the public is getting a rare look at a high-stakes war being waged by two old adversaries—the espionage agencies of America and the Soviet Union.

Fought with sex, money, blackmail and even violence, this spy war has a goal that goes far beyond theft of plans for a new gun or an advanced piece of technology. The stakes are the most closely held secrets of the intelligence services whose operations are crucial to national security.

Amid a deepening chill between the superpowers, the prospect of penetration is an ever present concern. Both sides are waging a relentless campaign to plant operatives within one another's spy services. For America, the chief target is Moscow's Committee for State Security—the KGB. For the Kremlin, it is the Central Intelligence Agency.


In this shadow world of lies, deception, double crosses and double agents, no one can say for certain which side holds the upper hand. Both powers can lay claim to major victories, but both have suffered costly and embarrassing defeats.

For the U.S., the latest setback came from an unlikely quarter—the Federal Bureau of Investigation, an agency that has long boasted a blemish-free record. Its spyproof image was shattered in October with the arrest of Richard W. Miller, 47, a 20-year FBI veteran accused of acting as an agent for the Soviet Union in the bureau's Los Angeles office.

The charge against Miller: Peddling secrets to a Soviet émigré named Svetlana Ogorodnikova, 34, a self-proclaimed KGB major who allegedly lured him into a personal relationship, then offered money for classified documents. The government claims the debt-strapped agent, married and the father of eight children, sought \$65,000 from the KGB.

Although the actual damage is unclear, Miller admits to giving Moscow a 25-page classified document that officials say would provide the KGB with a detailed picture of U.S. intelligence activities, techniques and requirements. The document did not, however, spell out names of active agents or details of current operations.

In the never ending spy war, both sides have found willing double agents. A KGB “mole” spent years working inside Britain's code-breaking center, diverting supersecret U.S. intelligence data to Moscow. America had a man inside Polish intelligence, blowing the cover on Soviet spy operations in the U.S. as recently as 1983.



KGB boss Chebrikov

KGB center in Moscow's Dzerzhinski Square.

CIA Director William Casey boasts that his agency last year helped give the KGB the worst setback in its history, aiding in expulsion of some 135 Soviet spies worldwide. Yet some critics in a position to know fear that U.S. services—particularly the CIA—are being placed at a disadvantage in the competition with their Soviet rivals.

“Today, the CIA is reluctant to mix it up with the KGB,” asserts a knowledgeable U.S. official. “It's a dicey game. Lots of things can

go wrong. They are not out there in every nook and cranny trying to roll up the KGB.”

Moscow's Quest for “Moles”

The prospect of a Soviet mole's burrowing into top U.S. intelligence echelons has haunted America ever since the defection of H. A. R. “Kim” Philby, one of Britain's most senior intelligence officials, to Russia some 20 years ago. U.S. jitters worsened when Heinz Felfe, a senior West German counterspy, surfaced as a KGB plant in the '50s.

The CIA itself was thrown into turmoil in the late 1960s and early 1970s by counterspy James Angleton's suspicions—which he never proved and which many ridiculed—that a KGB operative had penetrated the upper reaches of his agency. Angleton left the CIA in 1975.

The Kremlin devotes vast resources to infiltrating other spy services. Thousands work for the KGB, under the command of Marshal Viktor Chebrikov. Still more are employed by the military-intelligence arm known as GRU. They are supported by East European spy agencies.

By itself, the KGB is said to have 10,000 espionage officers assigned strictly to foreign spying—including 500 in the U.S. on diplomatic missions. Says a senior FBI official wryly: “We are blessed with the best agents the KGB has to offer. They are smooth and Westernized. They cultivate relationships with everyone from clerks to company presidents.”

The clearest penetration of the CIA came to light in late 1980 with the arrest of David Henry Barnett, who remains the only member of the CIA's officer ranks ever to be publicly unmasked as a KGB operative.

After working under cover for the agency in Indonesia through the 1960s, Barnett, now serving 18 years in prison, resigned in 1970 to start a private business in Jakarta. In a few years, his venture collapsed and financial losses mounted.

In 1976, Barnett—\$100,000 in debt—turned to the KGB for help. In Vienna and Jakarta, he delivered American defense information, including data about a secret CIA operation, to the KGB. He disclosed the names of Indone-

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The Choice for President

FOUR YEARS ago, in what must have been one of the most churlishly written and unenthusiastic editorial statements in modern history, this newspaper came out in favor of Jimmy Carter over Ronald Reagan. This year we endorse Walter Mondale—enthusiastically and without apology. We think Mr. Mondale—who has been maddeningly misread and mistreated by the political trendmakers this year, just as Mr. Reagan has been maddeningly indulged and overpraised—is unambiguously the better candidate.

So we conclude that much of the Reagan administration accomplishment has come very dear—and most important of all, its two principal claimed accomplishments, one foreign, the other economic, seem questionable to us, or at least greatly overstated. Take the foreign first. We do admire the manner in which this administration managed the confrontation over the European missiles in the first part of its term. That was its most important foreign policy success, though there have been others along with the failures. But in what sense is America "standing tall"? We believe the defense establishment did need bolstering, but what has occurred seems to us indiscriminate, helter-skelter and in some respects as phony as it is costly. Unrestricted money and discretion are not an answer to this country's defense needs. Within the administration the level of infighting over this and other national security issues as a reflection of policy disagreement and impasse has surpassed even that of the Brzezinski-Vance hate-affair or other struggles that come to mind.

In fact there has been an uncommon amount of turnover and turmoil in the national security apparatus of the Reagan administration and an uncommon amount of implacable enmity. No one ever said such terrible things about William Clark when he was White House national security aide or Caspar Weinberger or Richard Perle or Jeane Kirkpatrick or William Casey or Richard Allen or Alexander Haig as were said about them by other high administration officials. We respect many of the people conducting foreign policy in this administration, most notably Secretary of State Shultz, but nonetheless observe that the president has yet to permit or encourage the establishment of a steady, credible administration foreign and defense policy effort. His approach to arms control efforts has been fitful and temperamental and unyielding of achievement. He has proved no more skillful in the Middle East than Jimmy Carter was in the Persian Gulf. And his better people are still not in the clear. This is the administration that appointed a score of ambassadors who didn't know what was wrong with issuing a political statement in support of Jesse Helms's campaign.
